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<td>March, 2018</td>
<td>Changes warranted to address ESF construct, State Operating Levels, SEOC Organizational structure</td>
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<td>All pages reviewed and updated as warranted.</td>
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New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
Pandemic Annex

Section I: General Considerations and Planning Guidelines

A. Introduction

Although remarkable advances have been made in science and medicine during the past century, we are constantly reminded that we live in a universe of microbes that are forever changing and adapting themselves to the human host and the defenses that humans create. While science has developed highly effective vaccines and treatments for many infectious diseases that threaten public health, the United States faces a burden of influenza that results in approximately 36,000 deaths and more than 200,000 hospitalizations each year. In addition to this human toll, influenza is annually responsible for a total cost of over $10 billion in the United States\(^1\).

A pandemic could have a much more severe impact and has the potential to cause more death and illness than any other public health threat\(^2\). The last three pandemics, in 1918, 1957 and 1968, killed approximately 40 million, 2 million and 1 million people worldwide, respectively. If a pandemic influenza virus with similar virulence to the 1918 strain emerged today, in the absence of intervention, it is estimated that 1.9 million Americans could die and almost 10 million could be hospitalized over the course of the pandemic, which may evolve over a year or more.

New York State leadership recognizes the threat of a pandemic on the State’s population, critical infrastructure sectors, the private sector, the economy and our way of life. Multiple State planning endeavors are complete with continuing efforts to maintain/update policies, issues, mechanisms and responsibilities in preparing for and responding to this type of threat and emergency. Furthermore, both agency-specific and multi-agency planning efforts have been completed and will continue to build upon the foundation of the State’s collective response.

This Annex outlines New York State’s strategy in preparing for, responding to and recovering from a pandemic in a collective, multi-agency State approach.

B. Purpose

The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) has been structured into three distinct, but interconnected volumes. These are:

- Volume 1: All-Hazard Mitigation Plan
- Volume 2: Response and Short-Term Recovery
- Volume 3: Long-Term Recovery Plan

The purpose of the CEMP is to identify the State’s overarching policies, authorities and response organizational structure that will be implemented in an emergency or disaster situation that warrants a State response. In addition, the CEMP identifies the lines of coordination and the centralized coordination of resources that will be utilized in directing the State’s resources and capabilities in responding to and recovering from a disaster. Moreover, the CEMP serves as the foundational

framework for the State’s response levels, and serves as the operational basis on which other functional and hazard-specific annexes will build upon.

The purpose of this Annex is to ensure that the strategic and broad-based nature of the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is more defined to allow the State to adequately prepare for, respond to and recover from a pandemic. This will include utilizing individual agency activities as well as the activities of the State’s Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), as appropriate. Furthermore, this Annex identifies the key mechanisms in coordinating with the local response and identifies the lines of coordination to interoperate with the Federal response, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Pandemic Influenza Plan, via the National Response Framework (NRF).

C. Scope

In March, 2014, the New York State Department of Health released the updated New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. This plan was initially released in 2006. The plan takes a comprehensive and in-depth approach for assisting public health officials and healthcare providers in preparing for and responding rapidly and effectively to a pandemic, consistent with national guidance. The scope of this plan focuses on the response activities of State and local public health officials in the public health sector. The primary concepts include, but are not limited to, surveillance and laboratory testing, healthcare planning, infection control, clinical guidelines and vaccine procurement, distribution and use.

This Annex applies to any pandemic influenza that warrants a response beyond standard agency statutory obligations to a collective State Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) response. This Annex applies to all State agencies and authorities that may be directed to respond to such an event, and builds upon the process and structure of the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan by addressing unique policies, situations, operating concepts and responsibilities. Response operations to this type of event will encompass the efforts of the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and utilize existing capabilities of other functional and hazard-specific annexes to the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. Further, this Annex acknowledges that local and State response capabilities may be exceeded, necessitating the use of Federal agencies and resources.

If a potential novel strain of virus is evident in animals in the State, then State response operations for animal depopulation shall be coordinated as stated in Appendix 1 of the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex to the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Appendix for Emerging Infectious Diseases in Non-Human Populations.

D. Situation

Influenza pandemics occur when a novel influenza virus with little or no natural immunity emerges and has the potential to infect a large populous through efficient human to human transmission; resulting in a potential widespread illness. Animals are the most likely reservoir and vector for these emerging viruses. Historically, avian viruses played a role in the last three influenza pandemics. Two of these pandemic-causing viruses remain in circulation and are responsible for the majority of influenza cases each year.3

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3 Source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

NYS Pandemic Annex

Final: January, 2019
Advanced planning and preparedness are critical components necessary to mitigate the impact a pandemic might have on the populous. A pandemic is likely to come in waves or phases, each lasting weeks or months. The unique characteristics of a pandemic may strain local, State, and Federal resources. It is unlikely that there will be sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies to adequately respond to a pandemic that could overwhelm our nation’s health and medical capabilities.

In addition, while a pandemic will not cause any “physical” damage, it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructures by affecting essential personnel in the workplace for a period of time. This warrants planning efforts to consider a strategy that extends well beyond the health and medical sector, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of goods and services, and economic and security considerations.

In 1999, the World Health Organization (WHO) published guidance that defined the phases of an influenza pandemic. Updated guidance was published in 2005, 2013 and again in 2017 to redefine these phases. The most recent publication in 2017 provides a significant amount of data from the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. Diagram 1 on the following page identifies the current WHO classification system of a pandemic.
The current WHO guidance from 2017 includes a risk-based management approach to a pandemic influenza; as linked to preparedness, response, and recovery, the conceptual framework encourages members to develop flexible plans based on a national risk assessment. In 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published their updated response framework.

It is important to note that the WHO does not identify a post-pandemic period to the phase schema. Although not part of the WHO Phases for tracking the emergence of a pandemic, mitigation and recovery should be a part of every emergency response plan. Mitigation and recovery actions should be focused on continuing public health actions, including communication with the public on issues such as when public gatherings can resume, and continued monitoring of possible outbreaks of infection.

Represented in six (6) pandemic intervals, the CDC intervals provide a general framework for continuity purposes, but also accommodates unique planning considerations and flexibility to execute at all levels: local, State, and Federal. The CDC intervals are outlined in Diagram 2 below.

This schema has been utilized by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in the development of the Federal plan and by the New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH) in developing the Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. The goal of the schema is to assist public health officials and healthcare providers with preparedness, response, and recovery should an influenza pandemic occur. Each of these plans identifies response actions relative to a “phase” or “intervals” of the pandemic. (See Table 1 on the following page)
### TABLE. Preparedness and response framework for novel influenza A virus pandemics: World Health Organization phases and CDC intervals, with federal and state/local indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Health Organization phases</th>
<th>CDC intervals</th>
<th>Federal indicators for CDC intervals</th>
<th>State/Local Indicators for CDC intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpandemic phase:</td>
<td>Investigation: Investigation of novel influenza A infection in humans or animals anywhere in the world with potential implications for human health</td>
<td>Identification of novel influenza A infection in humans or animals in the United States with potential implications for human health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period between influenza pandemics:</td>
<td>Recognition of increased potential for ongoing transmission of a novel influenza A virus</td>
<td>Increasing number of human cases or clusters of novel influenza A infection anywhere in the world with virus characteristics indicating increased potential for ongoing human-to-human transmission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert phase:</td>
<td>Initiation: Initiation of a pandemic wave</td>
<td>Confirmation of human cases of a pandemic influenza virus anywhere in the world with demonstrated efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influenza caused by a new subtype has been identified in humans</td>
<td>Acceleration: Acceleration of a pandemic wave</td>
<td>Consistently increasing rate of pandemic influenza cases identified in the United States, indicating established transmission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic phase:</td>
<td>Deceleration: Deceleration of a pandemic wave</td>
<td>Consistently decreasing rate of pandemic influenza cases in the United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global spread of human influenza caused by a new subtype</td>
<td>Transition phase: Reduction in global risk, reduction in response activities, or progression toward recovery actions</td>
<td>Preparation: Preparation for future pandemic waves</td>
<td>Low pandemic influenza activity but continued outbreaks possible in some jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Preparedness and response framework for novel influenza A virus: World Health Organization phases and CDC intervals, with federal and state/local indicators - Source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Updated Preparedness and Response Framework for Influenza Pandemics; September, 2014.

The severity of a pandemic will be based on the virulence of the virus that presents itself. While the virulence of the virus cannot be predicted, two scenarios may be considered based on historical pandemics. Table 2 below identifies the potential number of indexed cases, deaths, and healthcare utilizations with moderate and severe pandemics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illnesses</td>
<td>60.8 Million</td>
<td>90 Million (30%)</td>
<td>90 Million (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatient Medical Care</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
<td>45 Million (50%)</td>
<td>45 Million (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalizations</td>
<td>274,304</td>
<td>865,000</td>
<td>9,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU Care</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
<td>128,750</td>
<td>1,485,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Ventilation</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
<td>64,875</td>
<td>742,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>12,469</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>1,903,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Deaths Associated with H1N1 Influenza and Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios. These estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during the 20th century pandemics - Source: U.S Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
It is evident that a pandemic may have far-reaching effects on the population as well as a variety of critical infrastructure sectors\(^4\), especially the public health sector. This is especially true when noting that the modalities that were present in previous pandemics pale in comparison to those of the twenty-first century. The potential severity of such an event, and its impact on the society creates a major concern for governments at all levels.

This Annex will attempt to tie additional response activities to the CDC Intervals for tracking to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activation levels as identified in Volume 2 of the New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, *Response and Short-Term Recovery*. However, the CDC Intervals nationally may not always correspond to SEOC activation levels, since New York State may not be experiencing the same pandemic challenges as other states.

**E. Planning Assumptions**

1. A pandemic is a public health emergency that rapidly takes on significant political, social, and economic dimensions. A pandemic is likely to affect all sectors of the critical infrastructure, public and private.

2. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be universal. The clinical disease attack rate will be 30% in the overall population. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20% will become ill during a community outbreak. Other viruses may have different clinical attack rates.

3. Of those who become ill with influenza, 50% will seek outpatient medical care. The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus. Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe scenarios.

4. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the country) of illness may be likely to occur with each wave lasting two (2) to three (3) months. Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.

5. The public healthcare system itself will likely be overwhelmed. This may have a cascading effect on those seeking medical attention for other (non-pandemic) illnesses and diseases.

6. Workforce support for all levels of government, volunteers and the private sector will be a necessary, if not vital, resource to acquire.

7. New York’s public health system relies on local health departments (LHDs) with authority and responsibility for public health preparedness and response at the local level. The State Department of Health provides leadership, support, and coordination of this effort, including during a multi-jurisdictional emergency. Although pandemic influenza may affect multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, all jurisdictional responsibilities are maintained. The State will provide additional support to leadership at the local level, without opposing the authority of LHDs.

8. The State may need to implement protective actions (non-medical containment) that will likely be unfavorable to the general public. This may include closing schools, restricting travel,
9. The incubation period can vary between 2-21 days. Non-medical containment will likely be covering the span of the incubation period until symptoms are presented.

10. Decisions about non-medical containment measures will be made in an atmosphere of considerable scientific uncertainty. Containment measures must be adapted to the epidemiological context of each phase of the pandemic.

11. Non-medical containment measures will be the principal means of disease control until adequate supplies of vaccine and/or antiviral medications are available.

12. Response actions need to be swift and decisive, necessitating the use of a variety of State and Federal statutes and authorities to effectively respond to and recover from a pandemic.

13. Vaccination and antiviral treatment are anticipated to be the most effective medical strategies for reducing pandemic influenza morbidity and mortality. However, effective vaccines or antiviral medications may be non-existent or in limited supply. The State will promote and coordinate use of vaccines and/or antivirals based on their availability and the best scientific evidence at the time.

14. Activities identified in any given pandemic phase are not necessarily assumed to be completed during that phase; activities started in one phase may continue into subsequent phases or reoccur as additional waves of the pandemic become evident.

15. It is possible that the State, in its response, may be eradicating animals that serve as a vector as well as responding to a pandemic impacting the population.

16. State agencies supporting this Annex may need to implement their lines of succession as identified in their agency-specific continuity of operations plan.

17. Government at all levels will likely be overwhelmed in a pandemic. This may have an adverse effect on the ability of the State to acquire support from Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) partners or acquire adequate Federal support under the National Response Framework (NRF).

18. Federal authorities under the Public Health Services Act allow the Federal government to implement quarantine or isolation measures upon the State and the general population.

F. **Concept of Operations**

1. Initial notification of novel flu cases (in non-humans) may be realized through Federal or State agricultural agencies. Similarly, initial notification of a potential case of a pandemic in humans may be realized through Federal or State health surveillance networks. In either of the above noted cases, this information will be quickly disseminated throughout the Nation and the State of New York.

2. If a pandemic is discovered in the State (in non-humans), response actions will commence as identified in the *Emerging Infectious Diseases in Non-Human Populations Appendix* to the ESF
3. Initial notification of a potential pandemic in New York State will likely come from practitioners, LHDs or from hospital emergency departments. This information will be realized through a variety of formal information and reporting mechanisms that exist within the health and hospital networks, overseen by the State Department of Health.

4. Samples for testing and surveillance taken by the provider will be sent to a local laboratory for analysis and/or sent to the Wadsworth Center and the CDC for confirmation.

5. Upon receipt of a confirmation that a potential pandemic has started or is imminent, notifications will be made to the public health sector via the mechanisms managed by the State Department of Health.

6. Upon receipt of the information, the New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH) will initiate the appropriate Health Alert Network (HAN) notifications to State Agencies, including the New York State Office of Emergency Management (NYS OEM).

7. Upon receipt, NYS OEM will consult with NYS DOH and other State agencies, as appropriate, to determine if conditions warrant a collective State response. At this point, a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group conference call would be initiated to consider the demographics and implications of the potential event.

8. Consideration will be given to activate multiple ESFs to explore the anticipated response issues and consequences specific to the disease. The discussion should determine if the event can be mitigated through daily statutory-type responses (at the State and/or local level) or if the response warrants an activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

9. If conditions warrant the activation of the SEOC, then NYS OEM will notify the appropriate ESF coordinating and member agencies, including ESF #1, ESF #3, ESF #4, ESF #5, ESF #6, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #11, ESF #12, ESF #13 and ESF #15. In addition, NYS OEM will notify the county emergency manager(s), and others as deemed necessary.

10. NYS OEM will coordinate response activities in support of ESF #8 and the Coordinating Agency – NYS DOH, along with the other activated ESFs, being cognizant of response operations at the local level, and may utilize local/regional Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) to facilitate response activities.

11. The Governor could exercise his authority and issue a State Disaster Emergency Declaration to direct any and all State agencies, including non-DPC agencies, to provide assistance under the coordination of the Disaster Preparedness Commission.

12. State assistance will be supplemental to local efforts. Support may include providing public health and emergency medical support, mortuary support, implementing traditional and/or non-traditional Points of Dispensing (PODs) for vaccine, providing security in quarantine and isolation, providing human-needs support and requesting/supporting operations of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
13. NYS OEM will coordinate with the Federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and ensure coordination with State and Federal ESFs.

G. Legal Authorities

This authority to develop this Annex and implement specific response actions to effectively respond to a pandemic can be found in a variety of New York State Laws, regulations and Federal authorities, including:

1. State Authorities

NYS Executive Law, Article 2B.
NYS Public Health Law; Multiple Articles and sections.
NYS Code Rules and Regulations; Title 10, multiple citations.

2. Federal Authorities

Section 361 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act (42 U.S.C. 247d) authorizes the Secretary to make and enforce regulations necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States, or from one state or possession into any other state or possession. CDC administers these regulations as they relate to quarantine of humans. Diseases for which individuals may be quarantined are specified by Executive Order 13375, which amended the Executive Order 13295 to include pandemic influenza. Other provisions permit HHS to establish quarantine stations, provide care and treatment for persons under quarantine, and provide for quarantine enforcement.

H. Plan Maintenance and Updating

This Annex will be routinely updated and supplemented as local, State and Federal plans and procedures evolve. Plan changes may be based upon experiences and lessons-learned from exercises, or from real-world events. Ongoing planning efforts will focus on ensuring that the necessary and appropriate contacts with local, State, and Federal officials have coordinated their response.

NYS OEM will be the lead agency responsible for coordinating the update of this document, and will endeavor to initiate the revision process, with completion by March 1st of each year, as appropriate.
New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
Pandemic Annex

Section II: Risk Reduction

A. Preparedness

To some extent, risk reduction measures are taken on an on-going, routine basis. While more risk reduction activities will be implemented during a pandemic alert phase and pandemic period, recent events throughout the world have resulted in additional preparedness measures in a variety of ways.

1. Awareness and Surveillance

   a. The World Health Organization (WHO) has identified various strains of flu and a potential pandemic as an international priority. The WHO uses an intelligence and surveillance networking from across the globe.

   b. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) conducts extensive surveillance and monitoring through the U. S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Extensive outreach has been conducted abroad as well as to state health departments in the United States. Surveillance nodes include state-level information as well as outpatient surveillance, mortality surveillance, hospital surveillance and virologic surveillance.

   c. In the United States, surveillance for animal-borne influenza viruses is conducted by states and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Diagnostic testing is performed by state and industry laboratories, with confirmatory testing by USDA/APHIS Veterinary Services at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.

   d. The New York State Department of Health utilizes several disease surveillance networks that actively collect and analyze information to determine an outbreak of a disease, including a pandemic.

   e. Per the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, the Department has and will continue to promote pandemic awareness throughout the public health sector.

2. Planning and Training

   a. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a plan for international events and has issued guidance to each country. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has developed a national plan for coordinating response and recovery activities of Federal agencies identified in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Plan for Pandemic Influenza. This plan also includes planning guidance for states to follow, which was utilized by the New York State Department of Health.
b. The State Department of Health has developed the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. The plan applies public health support to local government and the health sector. The New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan will be supportive of this Annex to the State CEMP, which coordinates response activities to other sectors in a multi-agency setting.

c. Per the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, the Department will promote and institute a variety of training throughout the public health sector before, during and after a pandemic.

d. Several State-level exercises have been conducted and serve as training and planning components in preparing for a pandemic.

3. **Continuity of Operations Planning and Workforce Support**

a. New York State agencies have been actively involved in Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP). Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) agencies were provided two guidance documents and training programs to use to assist in their COOP efforts. The documents, issued by the State Office of Emergency Management, exceeded the minimum benchmarks found in NFPA 1600 (Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs) and guidance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Relative to a pandemic, the document identified a mechanism for identifying mission critical activities, mitigation, prioritization of programs and a line of succession of at least three persons deep. Many of the DPC agencies, as well as other State (non-DPC) agencies have used this COOP methodology or something similar via a contractor in their COOP endeavors. Many State agencies have completed their COOP efforts, while others are in varying points of the planning process.

b. In January, 2006, NYS OEM held a pandemic educational training forum in support of NYS DOH. This forum provided an opportunity to reiterate the need for COOP planning, specifically applied to a pandemic.

c. The State has a variety of vendors and contractors that could augment State agency personnel during a pandemic. The NYS Office of General Services maintains the State’s contract and procurement mechanism, which includes personnel that can be acquired through staffing services.

d. The New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan has identified workforce support mechanisms that could be used during a pandemic to ensure disaster mental health services training is made available during a pandemic.

e. Section 27 of State Executive Law, Article 2B identifies that local governments must develop COOP for their usage, and only a handful of jurisdictions currently have COOP plans.

f. In 2014, the State received its accreditation under EMAP; included in the accreditation is a Continuity Plan requirement for the nine (9) DPC agencies. All DPC agencies will have completed their COOPs by 2019.
New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
Pandemic Annex

Section III: Response

A. Overview

In identifying the State’s response actions, it is important to note that during a pandemic, LHDs will retain their responsibility. The key functional areas of the pandemic influenza response are surveillance and epidemiologic investigation, vaccine and antivirals operations, non-medical containment, surge capacity, infection control guidance to healthcare facilities, and risk communications. The role of the State is to provide the oversight to a locally-generated response and support the activities noted above. In providing support, the State response must be postured to coordinate with local government to fill response shortfalls, and must also be able to fully utilize and coordinate State and Federal assets in the response.

The fourteen ESF annexes to the State CEMP Volume 2 identify multi-agency activities in coordinating a collective State response in support of a specific function or activity. Each ESF is comprised of various agencies that are assembled to coordinate the activities of their own agency in support of the ESF’s activities. Agency-specific support of the ESF supplies an individual focus of that agency from the agency representative. Typically, the agency representative will not coordinate agency-specific activities outside the parameters or missions of the ESF. Thus, if an agency is needed to support multiple ESFs, and multiple ESFs are activated, then each agency may need to send multiple representatives to support the various ESFs.

B. Alert, Notification and Activation

There are several pandemic levels that are identified by both the WHO and CDC that follow a similar progression and response. Therefore, it is important to understand the relationship between the CDC Intervals, NYS DOH activities and State EOC activation levels to have an accurate picture of the correlation between the Federal and State response plans.

It is important to reiterate that multiple waves of a pandemic can be anticipated throughout the life cycle of the event. If the State, in its response, identifies that a pandemic is subsiding or is between waves, then response efforts may be scaled back to assess the response and prepare for the next wave, if any. On the following page is a chart that will outline the actions of the three organizations as the stages of the pandemic progress.
## CDC Intervals

| Investigation Interval: The investigation interval is characterized by low pandemic influenza activity, although outbreaks might continue to occur in certain jurisdictions | Steady State of Operations |
| Recognition Interval: WHO or CDC confirms cluster of novel influenza A with sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission anywhere in the world. | |

## PRE-PANDEMIC INTERVALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PRE-PANDEMIC INTERVALS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investigation Interval</strong>: Confirmation of human cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States with demonstrated efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acceleration Interval</strong>: Consistently increasing rate of pandemic influenza cases identified in the State, indicating established transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deceleration Interval</strong>: Consistently decreasing rate of pandemic influenza cases identified in the State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparation Interval</strong>: Low pandemic influenza activity, although outbreaks possible in the State.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PANDEMIC INTERVALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PANDEMIC INTERVALS</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiation Interval</strong>: Confirmation of human cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States with demonstrated efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 4 or 3</strong>: NYS OEM receives notification from NYS DOH that a potential pandemic may be imminent or is occurring in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong>: If the event is impacting the population in New York State, a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group discussion will decide Emergency Support Function (ESF) representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong>: When notification is received that a potential pandemic may be imminent in the state, MAC Group remains activated, possible activation of National Response Framework and emergency support function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NYS DOH / ESF #8 Actions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Notification of Pre-Pandemic, coordinate planning activities with bordering jurisdictions and unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review exercise and modify the plan on a periodic basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Steady State of Operations will remain to enhance surveillance of the pandemic virus will be initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activate the Interagency Task Force on Influenza Preparedness and meet with state agency partners to review and modify plan as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review, exercise and modify plan. Make contact with NYS DOH, NYS DAM; send Health Alert Network (HAN) Notification to Task Force Members</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NYS OEM Triggers</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Monitor and implement recommendations from programmatic or issue based sub groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Coordinate communication and recommendations with the NYS DPC agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In coordination with State and Federal partners, determine the need for activation of the NYS MCMDD Plan and relevant response actions to support operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Maintain communications with the NYS Interagency Taskforce on Influenza Preparedness and initiate the appropriate actions per relevant plans</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Steady State of Operations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Begin after-action activities, continue to promote vaccinations, respiratory etiquette, and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based upon the guidance of leadership and ESF #8, the EOC could begin to reduce the activation level retrograde activities are begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begin after action debriefing process/develop After-Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steady state of operations similar to the activity in the Investigation Interval, after-action review and debriefing is being conducted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**NYS Pandemic Annex**

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**Final: January, 2019**
Steady-State of Operations

The State EOC maintains a readiness posture, while conducting normal day-to-day, steady-state operations, including surveillance and monitoring of any potential emergency, via the NYS Watch Center (NYSWC). Likewise, disease surveillance is ongoing at the state and national level by NYS DOH and the CDC, respectively. The corresponding CDC intervals for this readiness posture would be the Investigation Interval and the Recognition Interval. Apart from continued surveillance and monitoring of any potential emergency situation, no further action would be taken at this time.

Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will be as follows:

- **Level 4:** This level may be initiated when the NYS OEM receives notification from NYS DOH that a potential pandemic may be imminent or is occurring in the United States and can be identified as being in the following intervals:

  - *Initiation Interval:* Confirmation of human cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States with demonstrated efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission (CDC).

  **At this level, the following actions may be taken:**

  - Ensure that each agency involved with incident management or incident support activities (if any) is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information to State and local governments;
  
  - Ensure that each agency establishes priorities in preparing for the event, including identifying available resources, future resources requirements, sector-specific coordination issues and the ability to implement an agency-specific continuity of operations plan;
  
  - Coordinate and resolve potential policy issues arising from the event, and provide strategic coordination as required.

  At this point, State and local agencies may take an increased role in monitoring the event and its potential impacts, if any, in New York State. Situational reporting and monitoring may be done by the NYS DOH, as conditions warrant.

- **Level 3:** This level may be initiated when the NYS OEM in discussions with the MAC Group receives an updated notification from the State Department of Health that a potential pandemic is occurring in the United States with some impact New York State. This level can be identified as being in the following interval:

  - *Initiation Interval:* Confirmation of human cases of a pandemic influenza virus in the United States with demonstrated efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission (CDC).

  If the event is impacting the population in New York State, a MAC Group conference call would be initiated to consider the implications of the potential event. The MAC Group will be composed of members from agencies with direct incident management responsibilities or significant incident management support or resource responsibilities.
At this level, the following actions may be taken:

- This level may include the activation of ICS-based sections in the SEOC to provide situational reporting and readiness to increase the State’s response posture, as appropriate.

- NYS OEM and the ESF #8 Coordinating Agency – NYS DOH will jointly identify which ESFs will be required to support the activation level and the current response.

- NYS DOH through ESF #8 may request that emergency measures be taken by the State to support local response activities.

- NYS OEM will activate and coordinate the responsibilities for ESF #5 and ESF #7.

➢ **Level 2:** This level may be initiated when NYS OEM in discussions with the MAC Group receives ongoing notification from NYS DOH that a potential pandemic may be imminent or is occurring in New York State and can be identified as being in the following interval:

- **Acceleration Interval** - Indicated by a consistently increasing rate of pandemic influenza cases identified in the State, indicating established transmission (CDC).

At this level, the following actions may be taken:

- NYS OEM and the ESF Coordinating Agencies will jointly identify which agencies of each ESF are required to support the activation level and the current response.

- NYS DOH through ESF #8 may request that emergency measures be taken by the State to support local response activities.

- Risk communications will be disseminated to the general public, to include subject matter as identified in the New York State Department of Health *Pandemic Influenza Response Plan.*

- Preparations may be made to support isolation or quarantine measures in support of the local response.

- Travel restrictions may be imposed for the area of concern.

- Schools and public gatherings in the area of concern may be cancelled or closed. Other institutions, such as rehabilitation facilities, hospitals, correctional facilities and universities may impose restrictions on ingress and egress in the area of concern.

- If available, the State may coordinate the distribution of vaccine and antivirals to the population at risk.

➢ **Level 1** This level may be initiated when NYS OEM receives notification from NYS DOH that a pandemic is occurring in the State and can be identified as being in the following phase:
• **Acceleration Interval** - Indicated by a consistently increasing rate of pandemic influenza cases identified in the State, indicating established transmission (CDC).

• This level will likely trigger the activation of the National Response Framework and ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services with Federal response.

**For Level 1 and Level 2 activations**, NYS OEM will request the following ESF Coordinating Agencies to send a representative to the State EOC:

ESF #1 Transportation: NYS Department of Transportation

ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering: NYS Department of Environmental Conservation

ESF #4 Firefighting: NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services – Office of Fire Prevention and Control

ESF #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services: NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services

ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services: NYS Department of Health

ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources: NYS Department of Agriculture and Markets

ESF #12 Energy: NYS Department of Public Service

ESF #13 Public Safety and Security: NYS Division of State Police

ESF #15 External Affairs: NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services – Public Information Office

At this level, the following actions may be taken:

• NYS OEM and the ESF Coordinating Agencies will jointly identify which member agencies of each ESF are required to support the activation level.

• Invoking or supporting isolation, quarantine or social-distancing requirements using State and Federal legal authorities, as appropriate, and coordinating with Federal authorities on measures to prevent the interstate spread of influenza. Actions may include the closing of schools, cancelling public gatherings and imposing movement restrictions in the general public and institutions, such as rehabilitation facilities, hospitals, correctional facilities and universities.

• Utilizing local, State and Federal facilities that can serve as triage and treatment centers and medical facilities. These include non-traditional sites (i.e., school gymnasiums) that may be used to support the response.

• Organizing and releasing State and Federal public health and medical response assets to include drugs and medical supplies such as antivirals, vaccine (if available) and assets from the State’s
Medical Emergency Response Cache (MERC) and/or the Strategic National Stockpile. This may be accomplished using traditional and/or non-traditional PODs.

- In concert with local government, coordinating the implementation of ESF #8, including capabilities under the U.S. Public Health Services (e.g., National Disaster Medical System, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams and Disaster Mortuary Teams).

- A Joint Information Center (JIC) may be established by ESF #15 (External Affairs) to inform the public on health-related matters, movement controls and restrictions. The JIC will serve as a coordinating point with local, State and Federal authorities on public messages to ensure that communications are consistent and accurate and ensuring that messages address anxieties, alleviate unwarranted concerns or distress, and enlist cooperation with necessary control measures. Risk Communications will be disseminated to the general public and will include, but not limited to, topics as identified in the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan.

- State agencies will conduct sector-specific outreach to industry providers and the private sector as to the status of their operation and identify any shortfalls in that entity’s ability to maintain its operation.

At some point, the State EOC activation level may be downgraded to a Level 2, Level 3 or Level 4 with the ability to quickly return to a higher level, if needed. An EOC activation level where response efforts have been scaled back would likely correspond to the CDC Deceleration Interval, which indicates a consistently decreasing rate of pandemic influenza cases in the State.

C. Response Organization/Direction and Control

The State of New York endorses the use of one response organizational structure that will include all responding agencies: local, State and Federal. State agencies will be organized under the framework of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS), as required by Executive Order 26 of 1996, and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), as required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) #5. ICS will be incorporated at the local and Federal levels as well. The over-arching structure of State command and control will be organized as stated in the Volume 2 of the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Response and Short-Term Recovery. Specific to pandemic, the State will utilize a Unified Command structure to coordinate the overall State response and will utilize all of the NIMS components deemed necessary, including the MAC Group, Area Commands and other coordinative elements at forward locations.

1. Joint Information Center/Public Information

The Joint Information Center (JIC) should serve as the sole source of official information regarding all incident activities (local, State, Federal). The JIC should provide a forum for the coordinated release of all information. JIC operations should be coordinated as stated in the Emergency Public Information Annex to the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). This may include the activation of a hotline or call center to support disseminating public information and adequately respond to public inquiries. Further, absent the Governor, the State Department of Health will serve as the lead in addressing pandemics issues specific that impact
D. Roles and Responsibilities

This section reviews existing roles, responsibilities and capabilities of State agencies, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and provides an overview of the Federal response.

1. Local Government

Local government will be actively involved in the response, and should be utilized to the fullest extent possible. Each county, and many local governments, has a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) which provides the framework for the jurisdiction’s response to emergencies and disasters. As previously identified, the collective efforts of the State Health Department and the State Office of Emergency Management (SOEM) led to the development of sample plans for local government to use in planning for pandemic influenza; it is anticipated that many counties have some sort of annex in process or completed. Further, it is recognized that some counties do not possess a full public health component and rely upon the State to provide the public health function. As such, those counties, while limited in number, may require more State support than those that have a viable local public health component.

Each locally-developed plan will differ in its implementation, including in response capabilities, surge capacities and in the ability to exercise authorities. Therefore, it is prudent upon the State to conduct timely situational reporting to identify any gaps in the protective measures that are promulgated either at the local, State or Federal levels of the response.

2. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Agency-Specific Roles

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that are activated in support of this type of event will collectively utilize the resources available to them pertinent to the operation. ESF Coordinating Agencies will manage all activities within the ESF to effectively respond to the demands of the incident; the ESF Member Agencies will assist and support all activities tasked to the ESF. ESFs will coordinate their actions cognizant of over-arching policies and authorities, statutory or otherwise, as outlined in each ESF Annex and the State CEMP.

The following lists the ESF activities specific to this incident. The text identifies only those actions that are unique to this type of event, and are not already identified in each of the above listed documents.

a) ESF #1 – Transportation

The capabilities of ESF #1 may vary during the winter season or in times of disaster that require debris clearance or emergency repairs to transportation infrastructure. ESF #1 can assist in:

• Providing guidance for re-routing of traffic in and around affected areas.
• Supporting local response activities, such as snow clearing and removal, if the pandemic occurs over the winter season.

• Supporting traffic and access control points.

• Providing coordination for the passage of Federal assets over the State and local roadways.

b) **ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering**

• In coordination with ESF #8, evaluate the potential health effects of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in water and wastewater systems.

c) **ESF #4 – Firefighting**

• Provide coordination for fire resources support through the NYS State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid Plan.

d) **ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services**

• Coordinate the identification and access to facilities that may be used as mass care centers.

• Coordinate the use of disaster mental health services for victims and their families, including response agency representatives at the local and State level.

• Coordinate the request, acquisition and distribution of food and water to support the general population in areas that have had movement restrictions imposed. This will be done in close coordination with ESF #13.

• NYS Education Department (SED) - disseminate safe practices, risk information and sanitary information to the school community at-risk.

• SED - coordinate the closure of schools with the appropriate districts and superintendents.

e) **ESF #7 – Logistics**

• Provide support for the procurement of commodities, contracting services and labor.

• Provide resources, including office space, office furniture and equipment to support response efforts.

• Identify and secure locations that can be utilized by State and Federal response personnel as staging areas, base camps or rest and rehabilitation centers.

• Provide logistical support for the transport of equipment and supplies for response efforts.
f) ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services

ESF #8 will likely have the largest set of tasks and responsibilities during a pandemic. Response and recovery operations will encompass the activities from an agency-specific (statutory) standpoint and from a multi-agency disaster response standpoint. ESF #8 will:

- Assess and implement enhanced surveillance in both affected and unaffected localities and activate revised surveillance protocols, as needed.

- Coordinate laboratory testing, providing guidance to local laboratories, and coordinating the use of State and Federal labs to respond to the surge of multiple tests.

- Per the New York State Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, develop and disseminate (including to the public, as appropriate) a dynamic, prioritized list of treatment and prophylaxis recommendations, clinical guidelines and priority recipients. Disseminate case and contact management protocols to ensure suspect cases are promptly identified and isolated, and contacts are located, quarantined, and monitored for symptoms, as appropriate. Dissemination will be done through the ESF 15 / JIC in coordination with the MAC Group and SEOC Command.

- Coordinate the identification and access to facilities that may be used for triage, treatment centers and PODs.

- Coordinate the use and distribution of antivirals and Federally supplied vaccine (if available) to ensure an adequate supply to priority geographic areas and recipients.

- Identify and utilize facilities that may be used to stage medical supplies, Managed Inventory (MI), MERC, antivirals, or vaccine.

- Coordinate the use of volunteers that can be used at traditional and/or non-traditional PODs and the SNS mobilization center and distribution sites.

- Activate infection control procedures and disseminating guidance to minimize transmission of influenza in homes, the community, healthcare facilities and mass care centers. This guidance will include recommendations on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) that should be worn by State and local responders and other public and private entities. The release of this information will be done through the ESF 15 / JIC and in coordination with the MAC Group and local government.

- During the response, ESF #8 will examine the potential of a novel virus to infect other animals and humans through drinking water and waste water systems.

- Utilize applicable State legal authorities to ensure availability of additional beds and alternate facilities, including State facilities.

- Coordinate with EMAC assets (if supplied) and ESF #8 for the following:
. Assessing the public health and medical needs in unison with the Federal Incident Response Coordination Team. This includes an assessment of the healthcare system/facility infrastructure.
. Responding to medical surge capacities; identifying Federal facilities (e.g., VA, Federal military installations) that may be able to support triage and treatment.
. Coordinating the receipt and distribution of the SNS (Managed Inventory), MERC, and obtaining medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals, and restocking healthcare facilities.
. Coordinating State and Federal medical personnel (USPHS, NDMS, DMAT) to support inpatient hospital care and outpatient services, including in mass care centers.
. As needed, coordinating with Disaster Mortuary Services (DMORT) in establishing temporary morgue facilities, victim identification, and processing, preparing and disposition of the remains. This will be done in strict coordination with the local medical examiner.

• Invoke State legal authorities, such as the suspension of licensing requirements, to support the availability of surge clinical and hospital staffing, holding and control drugs and medical supplies intended for wholesale distribution, obtaining necessary inventories, and coordinating the distribution of assets to the designated locations.

• Recommend to LHDs the most feasible, effective, and enforceable methods of isolation and quarantine to prevent the spread of influenza.

• Provide training, including just-in-time training, to build public health and healthcare.

• Coordinate EMS assets in support of jurisdictions that are overwhelmed.

• Coordinate EMS assets that will serve mass care centers, adjunct medical facilities and shelter operations. Operations may include assisting in triage, treatment and transport of affected individuals to primary, secondary and tertiary facilities.

• Support the procurement and distribution of antivirals and vaccine (if available).

g) ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources

• If the novel virus is still active in the animal population, ESF #11 will serve as the lead in eradication of that vector. ESF #11 will provide situational status reports on response operations to inform the MAC Group and SEOC Command Staff of the effectiveness of eradication efforts.

• ESF #11 may assist in the trace-forward or trace-back for an event of this type. This will likely be the case if the novel virus first appears in animals and is zoonotic.

h) ESF #12 – Energy

• Identify and support public and private utility providers that may have difficulty continuing to operate due to employee absenteeism.
• If the electric or fuel supply or delivery systems are impacted, ESF #12 will coordinate the implementation of the Energy Emergency Annex to the State CEMP, as required, to support the response. The NYS Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the lead for petroleum and coal emergencies and the Department of Public Service (DPS) is the lead for electrical systems and natural gas emergencies.

i) ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security

• Provide support in implementing security measures at the SNS Mobilization center, traditional and/or non-traditional PODs, and distribution points where medical assets are being distributed to medical personnel.

• Provide support to local law enforcement that have been overwhelmed or affected by the pandemic.

• Coordinate traffic and access control points for areas where travel restrictions were identified, including interstate thoroughfares.

• Support security at mass care centers, adjunct medical facilities and morgue sites.

• Provide security for the transportation of commodities, supplies and relief materiel that may be scarce during a sustained pandemic.

3. Banking Department, State Insurance Department, Department of Taxation and Finance, Empire State Development Corporation

• The above noted agencies will disseminate risk communication information throughout the business and financial sectors respective to each agency’s purview.

• Based on statutory authorities, each agency will conduct an assessment of the financial sector to ascertain viability, status and support mitigative measures to lessen the impact of a pandemic on that sector. This may include broad discretionary powers that may be utilized to lessen the impact on banking and interrupt or disturb public confidence in the financial sector.

• Agencies will work collectively to ensure that the business and financial sectors in the State continue to support the general population.

• Agencies will explore opportunities to expedite the receipt and transfer of funds, tax credits, and the receipt of life insurance or disability policies for victims of a pandemic.

4. Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, State Civil Service, Department of Labor

• Identify and disseminate guidance to State agencies in human resources issues, concerns and union-related activities. The guidance should consider leave accruals and any
adjustments the State can make to allow employees to attend to themselves or their families if they become ill.

- Jointly identify staffing capabilities on State contract that could support State agency staffing.
- Explore opportunities to expedite the canvass and hiring process, including temporary workers, to fill vacancies in State government.
- Work with the State Department of Labor to coordinate recruitment, classification and assignment of workers to meet essential needs.

5. **Waiver of Restricting Codes**

The response and recovery to a pandemic may warrant the State to provide waivers for codes to facilitate the State’s efforts. The waivers would serve as actions taken to temporarily suspend or modify codes, laws and regulation so that emergency response operations are not unnecessarily hindered or restricted. The authority to implement these modifications rests with the State agency that has statutory authority to do so. These include:

- **Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES):** Provides legal advice to the NYS DPC.
- **ESF #11 – NYS Department of Agriculture and Markets (DAM):** Provides inspection and testing of food to insure safety; may use embargo authority.
- **ESF #6 – NYS Education Department (SED):**
  - Normal reporting and administrative requirements may be waived during emergencies; and
  - School nutrition program requirements may be waived to provide food for emergency needs at a reduced or no cost; and
  - The waiver of other school requirements may be considered on an ‘as needed’ basis.
- **ESF #12 – NYS Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA):** In the event of a declared energy emergency, the NYSERDA can waive state and local environmental protection requirements to the extent necessary for emergency use of energy resources not meeting such requirements for a limited period. In addition, the NYSERDA assists the State Department of Transportation in applying for waivers of Federal transportation restrictions for fuel delivery.
- **ESF #6 – NYS Department of Labor (DOL):** Activates special assistance programs such as Disaster Unemployment Assistance for those who may not be eligible for regular Unemployment Insurance benefits.
- **NYS Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV):** In the event a gas rationing plan is in effect, DMV assists the NYSERDA by distributing applications for exemptions from the gas rationing plan. The applications are reviewed by department personnel, with stickers to exempt individuals being issued immediately.
• **ESF #6 – NYS Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA):** OTDA takes all necessary action to expedite the provision of financial and Social Services assistance to victims of disaster.

• **ESF #1 – NYS Department of Transportation (DOT):** Grants waivers for overweight vehicles and oversize equipment limits on the NYS DOT system due to structural considerations on bridges and pavement. This capability can also be utilized by the Thruway Authority and the State Bridge Authority. NYS DOT grants permits for overweight vehicles and oversize equipment limits on the NYS DOT system due to structural considerations on bridges and pavement. May grant approval for extended hours of labor by personnel that drive large commercial motor vehicles and are involved in emergency restoration of electric, gas and/or communications utility services or in the emergency distribution of heating fuels.

6. **State/Federal Coordination under the NRF and the HHS Pandemic Influenza Response Plan**

   a) **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

   The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may implement the National Response Framework, which provides a mechanism for organizing, coordinating, and mobilizing Federal resources to augment State and local resources.

   Under the National Response Framework, DHS/FEMA may employ a variety of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) for coordinating response and recovery activities. As identified in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services *Pandemic Influenza Response Plan*, Federal response planning efforts have definitively pre-identified only one ESF to be activated for a pandemic, that being ESF #8 - Health and Medical Services. However, the plan does identify that other ESFs will be utilized as appropriate during a pandemic.

   In New York State, the State ESF #8 will be the lead in coordinating with the Federal ESF #8. The lines of coordination of all the State ESFs can be found in attachment 2: *State/Federal Coordination for Resources and Resource Support.*

   b) **United States Department of Health and Human Services**

   The Department of Health and Human Services has a major role in implementing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services *Pandemic Influenza Response Plan* and in being the coordinating agency in ESF #8. An all-inclusive list of activities of HHS during a pandemic is beyond the scope of this document. Therefore, in summary, the HHS will:

   1. Under the auspices of the National Response Framework, provide the direction, coordination and integration of overall Federal efforts to provide public health and medical assistance to the State.
   2. Task appropriate Federal agencies in deploying health and medical personnel, equipment and supplies, including the direct deployment of US Public Health Services in support of health and medical operations.
   3. Promulgate and enforce regulations to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.
   4. Conduct and support investigative measures into the cause, treatment and prevention of a disease or disorder.
7. **Sector and Agency-Specific Lines of Coordination with the Federal Response for Continuity of Operations**

Unlike a traditional disaster, a pandemic is not likely to cause direct, physical damage to the infrastructure. However, a true pandemic will adversely affect the health and welfare of the general population over a large geographic area. The affected population makes up the backbone of our society as we know it. A pandemic that impacts the population on such a large scale may be accompanied by a variety of cascading effects and indirect impacts that have a profound impact on government’s ability to provide essential services and maintain our critical infrastructure.

As identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that underpin American society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose exploitation or destruction could cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties. Critical infrastructure is so vital that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction could have a debilitating effect on security and economic well-being. Consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Secretary of Homeland Security has produced the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which outlines national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR).

The NIPP is based upon a risk management framework that takes into account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences when prioritizing CI/KR protection activities. It provides an integrated, comprehensive approach to addressing physical, cyber, and human threats and vulnerabilities to address the full range of risks to the Nation. The NIPP identifies Federal sector-specific agencies (SSAs) that will support preparedness, response and recovery across a number of critical infrastructure sectors. It provides a roadmap for identifying CI/KR assets, assessing vulnerabilities, prioritizing assets, and implementing protection measures in each infrastructure sector. For each sector, the NIPP delineates roles and responsibilities for Federal (SSAs) in carrying out these activities, with DHS as the lead agency and single point of accountability and coordination.

While the NIPP is geared primarily towards protecting the infrastructure, the information and coordination that can be gleaned from the NIPP will be invaluable to the State in response to a pandemic. The vulnerabilities and capabilities for each sector have been identified, the results of which can be extrapolated into the State’s pandemic response. This was done at the Federal level when looking at the NRF in relation to the NIPP. NRF response planning is informed by the most current and accurate assessments of CI/KR vulnerabilities. The primary agencies for the ESFs identified in the NRF are to access the information capabilities of the NIPP as they pertain to the response capabilities of the ESF. During the response phase of an incident, the information derived from NIPP implementation can be used to support initial response capabilities under the NRF. During an Incident of National Significance, DHS may designate an Infrastructure Liaison to serve as the principal advisor to the NRF response structure regarding all national and regional CI/KR related issues. In the absence of real-time incident information, the NIPP data can be modeled to provide anticipated consequences, and initial resources can be activated and deployed based on those predictions. Those models can support the State’s decision in operational planning cycles during a pandemic. NRF recovery activities benefit from a centralized listing of CI/KR assets by geographic area, and a mechanism for coordinated damage assessment, available through the NIPP. The NRF emergency response planning mechanism can use this information to prioritize recovery actions and resources.
To meet this challenge, the State has identified key lines of coordination to link existing State resources and capabilities to Federal resource support. State activities include ESF-specific multi-agency coordination with Federal ESFs as identified in the National Response Framework. The technical basis for each agency activity is linked to a specific sector of the critical infrastructure. These concepts can be found in Attachment 2: State/Federal Coordination for Resources and Resource Support.

8. Intrastate, Interstate and International Issues

As with other types of disasters, a pandemic will not stop at borders. In fact, imposing travel restrictions will likely be one of many primary means of non-medical containment. As such, three types of travel-related coordinative concerns need to be addressed: Intrastate, Interstate and International travel. Key points in coordinating these efforts are as follows:

a) Intrastate Coordination

The recommendation or mandate to impose travel restrictions will be identified by LHDs and ESF #8. State support may be needed to maintain the traffic and access control points, utilizing the capabilities of the State ESFs. Resource support and movement restrictions will be coordinated through local government as appropriate.

b) Interstate Coordination

The recommendation or mandate to impose interstate travel restrictions will be identified by Governor’s Office working with neighboring states and the Federal government. As with intrastate coordination, interstate coordination may require support to maintain traffic and access control points, utilizing the capabilities of the State ESFs. The resource support and movement restrictions will be coordinated through local government as well as with the neighboring state(s). The coordination with the local level in New York State will be managed through local government in the State via the command structure in place in New York. Interstate coordination will be managed through the State EOC to the State EOC of the state(s) in question.

c) International Coordination

Similar to interstate coordination, the recommendation or mandate to impose international travel restrictions will be identified by ESF #8 through health networks with the Federal government and the World Health Organization. As with interstate coordination, international coordination may require support to maintain the traffic and access control points, utilizing the capabilities of the State ESFs and Federal resources. The resource support and movement restrictions will be coordinated through local government as well as the neighboring country. The coordination with the local level in New York State will be managed through local government in the State via the command structure in place in New York. International coordination will be managed through the State EOC with Federal ESF #15 – External Affairs.
New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
Pandemic Annex

Section IV: Recovery

A. Overview

The nature of a pandemic is such that the event will not likely conclude within a set period of time. Unlike other natural disasters, a pandemic will likely come in waves, causing resurgence in the response until immunity is developed or vaccine has been widely distributed. While the period between waves may be difficult to identify, or predict, recovery from an influenza pandemic begins while the pandemic is still in progress, and continues during the periods between waves and following the pandemic. This phase of the response may be recognized following the Deceleration Interval (CDC), with an eventual transition to the Preparation Interval (CDC).

B. Demobilization of the State Response

The Preparation Interval (CDC) of the phase schema is initiated when State Office of Emergency Management receives notification from the State Department of Health that low pandemic influenza activity exists while continued outbreaks are possible in the State. This will be based on disease surveillance from the State Department of Health surveillance networks, including Federal counterparts, and the level of requests for State assistance necessary to support the response. As the pandemic subsides and the SEOC demobilizes, several actions or activities may be realized, including:

- Giving consideration to relaxing quarantine and isolation measures, traffic and access control points and demobilizing ICS field components that may have been deployed to coordinate the response.
- Assessing the effectiveness of the sector coordination, communications and response capabilities during the prior pandemic phases. Adjust as needed in anticipation of the next wave.
- Assessing resources and authorities that may be needed for subsequent pandemic waves.
- Estimating the overall pandemic impact on the State, including mortality, severe morbidity, financial impacts and the disaster recovery mechanisms that can support the general public.
- Continuing enhanced State surveillance and, via the Federal government, domestic and international surveillance to detect further pandemic waves.
- Assessing vaccine coverage, identify gaps and effectiveness of targeting to priority groups, and efficiency of distribution and administration; determine the number of persons who remain unprotected.
- Assessing vaccine and antiviral efficacy, safety, and the impact the distribution and administration the medicines had during the pandemic.
- Monitoring continued administration of vaccine to persons not previously protected.
• Continue incorporating mental health messages to facilitate continued self-care and recovery.

• Communicating with local government, healthcare providers, the media, and the public about any subsequent pandemic waves.

• Conducting an assessment of coordination during the period of pandemic disease and revise response plans, as needed. This may include a formal after-action review of pandemic response activities.

C. The Recovery Process

1. Funding and Compensation

Whenever the Governor finds that a disaster has occurred or may be imminent and local capabilities may be exceeded, the Governor may declare a State Disaster Emergency. Whenever the Governor finds that the event is of such severity and magnitude that the State may be overwhelmed, the Governor can request Federal assistance.

The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan outlines the disaster relief funding and programs that would be applicable for an incident of this type. Included are provisions for Public Assistance (PA) and Individual Assistance (IA), which would aid in supporting government response operations and provide some recovery assistance for individuals and their families, businesses and sectors identified in the preceding pages. The implementation of the recovery process is identified in Volume 2 of the State CEMP – Response and Short-Term Recovery.

In the event that the animal population is impacted by the pandemic, current Federal statutes provide for some support to the agricultural industry in response to an outbreak of animal disease. While limited, the compensation allows for fair market value of the products that were destroyed to limit the spread of a disease. New York State statutes also contain provisions for indemnity, but are limited to the amount of financial support to portions of the agricultural industry. Provisions for indemnity applicable to the agricultural industry can be found in the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex, Appendix for Emerging Infectious Diseases in Non-Human Populations.

2. Social and Economic Effects

The economic effects of a pandemic on the State, even on a small scale, may be enormous to the victims and their families, public and private entities, and to subsidiary and support industries of our economy. Employment may be affected over a wide range of sectors, from the farming and subsidiary industries, to distributors, the retail industry, to education and to government. The impact on the sectors that serve as the foundational elements of our way of life may have a cascading effect. The potential exists for many businesses that rely upon or support those sectors to be severely impacted, including local businesses, distributors, healthcare, and any reliable business, market, or industry. Movement restrictions invoked under State or Federal authorities during the response may promote erratic prices of common products, services or commodities. This is especially the case in the food service industry where most food providers maintain minimal or “just in time” inventories.
The State will need to take proactive measures in reenergizing the State’s economy. A variety of mechanisms to support the economy and the consumer (general public) in times of disaster are already identified in the State CEMP Volume 3 through the Recovery Support Functions (RSFs). In addition, these efforts may include:

- Monitoring excessive pricing practices to prevent “price-gouging”.
- Providing Unemployment Insurance Benefits and personnel services, including job counseling.
- Providing additional assistance to small businesses with grants and loan programs and assist an even larger group of businesses, through a broad range of services, to help the entire business community.
- Utilizing discretionary powers for abating penalties and extending tax due dates as warranted by the emergency.
- Providing advice on tax law provisions for losses related to the disaster.
- Working with lending institutions in requesting compassion and restraint for victims of a pandemic.

The bullets above note just a few of the potential State mechanisms that could be utilized to reenergize the economy and support the general population. The State’s ability to implement such actions, and others, rests with the agency that has the statutory obligation and authority to do so. Additional recovery programs can be found in Volume-3 of the State CEMP, *Long-Term Recovery.*

3. **Continual Mental Health and Workforce Support Services**

While unfortunate, it is recognized that a pandemic will likely result in a number of fatalities. In doing so, a pandemic will not discriminate when impacting the population. As a result, many entities, public and private, large and small, may have workforce support issues that will need to be resolved. The general public may also need support from experiencing the loss of loved ones, but also from experiencing movement and restriction controls that are extremely uncommon to our way of life.

During the response phase, disaster mental health services will be provided through ESF #6 via the State Office of Mental Health (OMH). The Office of Mental Health is the lead in ensuring that mental health services are available and is responsible for coordinating State and Federal mental health resources that are requested through the State Office of Emergency Management (SOEM). As the response organization demobilizes, State agencies will be afforded an additional opportunity to acquire mental health support from OMH via the existing response structure. This will allow for a more broad-based coordination of mental health support to State agencies utilizing the reporting and information sharing networks that will be active during the response.

Mental health activities may be ongoing for an extended period of time. Following demobilization, the Office of Mental Health will serve as the point of contact in providing mental health services. The support will be recognized through pre-existing channels to provide mental health counseling and workforce resiliency.

The State Department of Health *Pandemic Influenza Response Plan* identifies workforce support concepts and training materials to support the education of the State and local public healthcare partners. The goal in doing so is to assist in turning over the mental health services capability back to the local level for local government and the general public to utilize following the response.
Support for local mental health support should be made available to all of the necessary sectors as well as the general public. Through the recovery process, the availability of mental health support should be maintained and consistently disseminated throughout ongoing public information campaigns. This capability should be coordinated through local health departments to reach the needed audiences.

4. **Risk Reduction in Recovery**

   a. **Surveillance**

      Surveillance in the post-pandemic phase will be conducted by State, Federal and international public healthcare settings. In the State, ongoing virologic surveillance will be carefully coordinated by the State Department of Health to optimize the available resources and surveillance methodologies. The surveillance will be essential in quickly identifying any potential imminent waves of the pandemic to allow the State to resume the response posture.

   b. **Public Awareness**

      Public awareness and risk communications will be vital in successfully implementing a cohesive and coordinated response. The JIC will be the primary source of releases to the public to provide factual information on the status of activities, clinical signs and symptoms of pandemic influenza, and what the general public can do to protect themselves. This type of capability needs to continue through the recovery process. Following the demobilization of the JIC, the State Department of Health will be the single point of contact for all pandemic inquiries. The information that can be provided includes fact sheets on pandemic influenza, travel advisories, risk factors, and recommended steps the public can take to reduce their risk of illness. Further, information and education materials may be disseminated through various means, including media outlets, public health networks, web-based applications and on agency web sites.

**Attachments:**

- Attachment 1: *Alert, Notification and Activation of the State Response Organization*
- Attachment 2: *State/Federal Coordination for Resources and Resource Support*
- Attachment 3: *List of References used in Plan Development*
- Attachment 4: *Glossary and List of Acronyms*
- Attachment 5: *NYS GOER HR Guidance Memorandum*
Attachment 1

Alert, Notification and Activation of the State Response Organization
Investigation Interval:
Clinical observations via Local ERs, LHDs, realized through DOH Surveillance Networks

Recognition Interval:
State Department of Health in Humans; State Dept. of Ag & Markets in Animals

Health Alert Network Notification to Task Force Members

Initiation Interval:
EOC Activates to Level 4; A potential pandemic may be imminent or is occurring in the United States.

Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group Discussion

Acceleration Interval:
Impacting New York State
EOC Activates to Level 3 or Level 2; If the event is impacting the population in New York State.

Preparation Interval:
EOC Activation down to Level 3 or Level 4; Low pandemic influenza activity but continued outbreaks possible in the State.

Deceleration Interval:
EOC Activation from Level 1 down to Level 2 or Level 3; Due to consistently decreasing rate of pandemic influenza, or before the next wave of pandemic.

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) Activated
ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Information and Planning
ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services
ESF #7: Logistics
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #15: External Affairs

Federal Response
Emergency Support Functions
ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Information and Planning
ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services
ESF #7: Logistics
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #15: External Affairs
Attachment 2

State/Federal Coordination for Resources and Resource Support
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Infrastructure Sector</th>
<th>State Agency or ESF</th>
<th>Federal Coordination with ESF- resources to support the response.</th>
<th>ESF Coordinating Agency</th>
<th>Federal Sector-Specific Agency (SSA)</th>
<th>State/Federal ESF Coordinative Notes Specific to a Pandemic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>USDA, HHS</td>
<td>ESF 6: Non-medical mass care services to include sheltering of victims, organizing feeding operations, emergency first aid, coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief items.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>USDA, HHS</td>
<td>ESF 11: Can provide nutrition assistance; control and eradication of an animal /zoonotic disease outbreak, assurance of food safety and food security, protection of natural and cultural resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water and Wastewater Systems</td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>ESF 3: Assessments of public works and infrastructure; executing emergency contract support and real estate services.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>ESF 6: Coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Sector</td>
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<td><strong>Dams</strong></td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>ESF 3: Assessments of public works and infrastructure; executing emergency contract support and real estate services.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 12: Provide support and assistance to power producers; actions to assess energy supply demands; technical support to hydroelectric facilities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 13: Law enforcement support, credentialing, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, security for the SNS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Healthcare and Public Health</strong></td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>ESF 6: Human Services include providing victim-related recovery efforts such as counseling, identifying support for persons with special needs, expediting processing of new Federal benefits claims.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>HHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 8: Assessment of public health/medical needs (including behavioral health), public health surveillance, medical care (NDMS) personnel, medical equipment and supplies.</td>
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<td>ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 11: Nutrition assistance, control and eradication of an animal/zoonotic disease outbreak, assurance of food safety and food security.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #15: External Affairs</td>
<td>ESF #15: External Affairs</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 15: Public Affairs, community relations, congressional and international affairs, State and local coordination, and Tribal affairs.</td>
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<td>Critical Infrastructure Sector</td>
<td>State Agency or ESF</td>
<td>Federal Coordination with ESF - resources to support the response.</td>
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<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>USDA/FS</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 4: Provides personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of State, local, and tribal agencies involved in rural and urban firefighting operations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #5: Information and Planning</td>
<td>ESF #5: Information and Planning</td>
<td>DHS/FEMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 5: Deploy staff to support emergency response teams, logistics and material, direction and control, information management, resource acquisition and management, including allocation and tracking.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 7: Support contracting services and security services, and personnel required to support immediate response activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>HHS</td>
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<td>ESF 8: Can support emergency first aid.</td>
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<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>DHS/DOJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 13: Law enforcement support, credentialing, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, security for the SNS.</td>
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<td><strong>Commercial Facilities</strong></td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>USDA/FS</td>
<td>DHS</td>
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<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>DHS/ GSA</td>
<td>ESF 7: Support contracting services and personnel required to support immediate response activities.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>DHS</td>
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<td>ESF 15: Public affairs, community relations, congressional and international affairs, State and local coordination, and Tribal affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Industrial Base</strong></td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>ESF 3: Assessments of public works and infrastructure; executing emergency contract support and real estate services.</td>
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<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 7: Telecommunications support in accordance with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>ESF 12: Assist with requests for emergency response actions as they pertain to the Nation’s energy supply, locating fuel for transportation, communications, emergency operations, Federal actions to conserve fuel and electric power; provide energy supply information and guidance on the conservation and efficient use of energy to the State, assesses fuel and electric power damage and energy supply and demand, and identifies requirements to repair energy systems, recommends options to mitigate impacts, and coordinates restoration of energy systems.</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 12 (above) and see emergency services for additional State/Federal resource support.</td>
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<td>Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste</td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>ESF #12: Energy</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>ESF 12: Assist with requests for emergency response actions as they pertain to the Nation’s energy supply, locating fuel for transportation, communications, emergency operations, Federal actions to conserve fuel and electric power; provide energy supply information and guidance on the conservation and efficient use of energy to the State, assesses fuel and electric power damage and energy supply and demand, and identifies requirements to repair energy systems, recommends options to mitigate impacts, and coordinates restoration of energy systems. ESF 12 (above) and see emergency services for additional State/Federal resource support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>DHS/DOT</td>
<td>ESF 1: Processing and coordinating requests for Federal and civil transportation support, coordinating alternate transportation services; coordinating activities conducted under the direct authority of DOT elements such as air, maritime, surface, rail, and pipelines. ESF 6: Expedites mail services in affected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services</td>
<td>HHS</td>
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<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
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<td>ESF 7: Contracting services, including transportation services, in coordination with ESF #1.</td>
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<td>Critical Infrastructure Sector</td>
<td>State Agency or ESF</td>
<td>Federal Coordination with ESF resources to support the response</td>
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<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>ESF #2: Communications</td>
<td>ESF #2: Communications</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Dept. of Treasury</td>
<td>ESF 2: Coordinates to assess the need for telecommunications support for financial sector ISAC. ESF 7: Personnel support for requirements not specifically identified in other ESFs. Note: Federal coordination should be maintained through the Treasury to the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIIC) to a host of State, Federal and private banking and financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
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<td>Chemical</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 1: Processing and coordinating requests for Federal and civil transportation support, coordinating alternate transportation services; coordinating activities conducted under the direct authority of DOT elements such as air, maritime, surface, rail, and pipelines. ESF 7: Contracting services, including transportation services, in coordination with ESF #1. ESF 12: Assist with requests for emergency response actions as they pertain to the Nation’s energy supply, locating fuel for transportation, Federal actions to conserve fuel and electric power; provide energy supply information and guidance on the conservation and efficient use of energy to the State, assesses fuel and electric power damage and energy supply and demand.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Facilities</td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>ESF #4: Firefighting</td>
<td>USDA/FS</td>
<td>DOI</td>
<td>ESF 4: Provides personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of State, local, and tribal agencies involved in rural and urban firefighting operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #5: Information and Planning</td>
<td>ESF #5: Information and Planning</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 5: Deploy staff to support emergency response teams, logistics and material, direction and control, information management, resource acquisition and management, including allocation and tracking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
<td>DHS/GSA</td>
<td>ESF 7: Support contracting services and personnel required to support immediate response activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>ESF #13: Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 13: Law enforcement support, credentialing, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, security for the SNS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #15: External Affairs</td>
<td>ESF #15: External Affairs</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 15: Public affairs, community relations, congressional and international affairs, State and local coordination, and Tribal affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Manufacturing</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>ESF #1: Transportation</td>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 1: Processing and coordinating requests for Federal and civil transportation support, coordinating alternate transportation services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>ESF #7: Logistics</td>
<td>GSA/DHS/FEMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESF 7: Contracting services, including transportation services, in coordination with ESF #1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>ESF #2: Communications</td>
<td>ESF #2: Communications</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>ESF 2: Coordinates to assess the need for telecommunications industry support, ensures such support is available as needed, including personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attachment 3

List of References Used in Plan Development
The following is a list of documents that were used in the preparation of this Annex:

1. The New York State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP):
   
   Volume 2: Response and Short-Term Recovery, and all Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), as appropriate.

   Volume 3: Long-Term Recovery Plan


Attachment 4

Glossary and List of Acronyms
I. Glossary

**Adjuvant**: Substances that can be added to a vaccine to increase the effectiveness of the vaccine.

**Affected community**: An at-risk community experiencing endemic (widespread and recurring) or epidemic (isolated) cases in humans or domestic animals of influenza with human pandemic potential.

**Antiviral medications**: Medications presumed to be effective against potential pandemic influenza virus strains. These antiviral medications include the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (Relenza®).

**Arrival screening**: Medical screening upon arrival to detect individuals who have signs of illness or who are at high risk of developing illness.

**Asymptomatic**: Without symptoms.

**At-risk community**: An unaffected community with insufficient medical, public health, or veterinary capacity to prevent, detect, or contain influenza with pandemic potential.

**Containment**: Contain an outbreak to the affected region(s) and limit of spread of the pandemic through aggressive attempts to contain via isolation, quarantine or social distancing.

**Continuity of operations**: Refers to the capability to ensure the performance of essential functions during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations.

**Countermeasures**: Refers to pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral medications.

**Critical infrastructure**: Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. Specifically, it refers to the critical infrastructure sectors and key resources identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).

**Delegation of authority**: Identification, by position, the authorities for making policy determinations and decisions at headquarters, field levels, and other organizational locations, as appropriate.

**Domestic animals**: Livestock, including poultry, and other farmed birds or mammals; does not include companion animals such as dogs, cats, or pet birds.

**Dose sparing strategies**: Strategies to increase influenza vaccine immunogenicity and minimize the dose of vaccine necessary to confer immunity.

**Epidemic**: A pronounced clustering of cases of disease within a short period of time; more generally, a disease whose frequency of occurrence is in excess of the expected frequency in a population during a given time interval.
**Essential functions:** Functions that are absolutely necessary to keep a business operating during an influenza pandemic, and critical to survival and recovery.

**Geographic quarantine:** The isolation of localities with documented disease transmission from localities still free of infection.

**High-risk community:** An at-risk community that is located in proximity to an affected area, or in which a wildlife case of influenza with pandemic potential has been detected.

**Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI):** An infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus that meets the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) definition for high pathogenicity based on the mortality rate of chickens exposed to the virus.

**Isolation:** Separation of infected individuals from those who are not infected.

**Key assets:** Subset of key resources that are “individual targets whose destruction could cause large scale injury, death, or destruction of property, and/or profoundly damage our national prestige or confidence.”

**Key resources:** Publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government. This refers to the four key resources identified in HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. These four key resources include: dams; government facilities; commercial facilities; and nuclear reactors, material, and waste.

**Live bird marketing system (LBMS):** Live poultry markets in the United States and the poultry distributors and poultry production premises that supply those markets.

**Lines of succession:** Refers to the sequential order or ranking of individuals who would assume authority and responsibility if the leadership is incapacitated or unavailable.

**Pandemic:** A worldwide epidemic when a new or novel strain of influenza virus emerges in which humans have little or no immunity, and develops the ability to infect and be passed between humans.

**Pandemic vaccine:** Vaccine for specific influenza virus strain that has evolved the capacity for sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission. This vaccine can only be developed once the pandemic strain emerges.

**Points of Dispensing (PODs):** Locations or facilities where state and/or local authorities will be distributing vaccine or anti-viral medications, if available. These types of facilities are considered “traditional PODs”. Non-traditional PODs would be a means to distribute vaccine or antivirals while maintaining social distancing, such as “drive through” centers where occupants of a vehicle do not exit the vehicle but receive the required medication.

**Post-exposure prophylaxis:** The use of antiviral medications in individuals exposed to others with influenza to prevent disease transmission.
Prophylaxis: The prevention of a disease or of a process that can lead to disease. With respect to pandemic influenza this specifically refers to the administration of antiviral medications to healthy individuals for the prevention of influenza.

Quarantine: Separation of individuals who have been exposed to an infection but are not yet ill from others who have not been exposed to the transmissible infection.

Sector: Part or division of the national economy.

Sector-Specific Agency: Federal departments and agencies identified under HSPD-7 as responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.

Social distancing: Infection control strategies that reduce the duration and/or intimacy of social contacts and thereby limit the transmission of influenza. There are two basic categories of intervention: transmission interventions, such as the use of facemasks, may reduce the likelihood of casual social contacts resulting in disease transmission; contact interventions, such as closing schools or canceling large gatherings, eliminate or reduce the likelihood of contact with infected individuals.

Surge capacity: Refers to the ability to expand provision of services beyond normal capacity to meet transient increases in demand. Surge capacity within a medical context denotes the ability of health care or laboratory facilities to provide care or services above their usual capacity, or to expand manufacturing capacity of essential medical materiel (e.g., vaccine) to meet increased demand.

Telecommuting: Working from home or an alternate site and avoiding coming to the workplace through telecommunication (computer access).

Treatment course (antiviral medications): The course of antiviral medication prescribed as treatment (not prophylaxis) for a person infected with an agent susceptible to the antiviral medication.

Treatment course (vaccine): The course of vaccine required to induce protective immunity against the target of the vaccine.

Virulence: Virulence refers to the disease-evoking severity of influenza.

Wave: The period during which an outbreak or epidemic occurs either within a community or aggregated across a larger geographical area. The disease wave includes the time during which disease occurrence increases rapidly, peaks, and declines back toward baseline.

II. List of Acronyms

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
BLS Basic Life Support
CDC U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEMP NYS Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CI/KR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
COOP Continuity of Operations Planning
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
DMNA  Division of Military and Naval Affairs
DMORT  Disaster Mortuary Services
DOD  Department of Defense
DOT  Department of Transportation
DPC  NYS Disaster Preparedness Commission
DPS  Department of Public Service
EMS  Emergency Medical Services
EOC  Emergency Operations Center
EMAC  Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EPA  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERT-A  Federal Emergency Response Team-A
ESF #1  Emergency Support Function (Transportation)
ESF #2  Emergency Support Function (Communications)
ESF #3  Emergency Support Function (Public Works and Engineering)
ESF #4  Emergency Support Function (Firefighting)
ESF #5  Emergency Support Function (Information and Planning)
ESF #6  Emergency Support Function (Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services)
ESF #7  Emergency Support Function (Logistics)
ESF #8  Emergency Support Function (Public Health and Medical Services)
ESF #9  Emergency Support Function (Search and Rescue)
ESF #10  Emergency Support Function (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response)
ESF #11  Emergency Support Function (Agriculture and Natural Resources)
ESF #12  Emergency Support Function (Energy)
ESF #13  Emergency Support Function (Public Safety and Security)
ESF #15  Emergency Support Function (External Affairs)
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
HAN  NYS DOH Health Alert Network
HHS  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HPAI  Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus
HSPD #5  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5; NIMS
IA  Individual Assistance
ICS  Incident Command System
IMT  State Incident Management Team
ITS  NYS Office of Information Technology Services
JIC  Joint Information Center
LHD  Local Health Department
MERC  Medical Emergency Response Cache
MI  Managed Inventory
NDMS  National Disaster Medical System
NFPA 1600  Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
NIMS  National Incident Management System
NIIMS  National Interagency Incident Management System
NIIPP  National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NRF  National Response Framework
NYSERDA  NYS Energy, Research and Development Authority
OMH  NYS Office of Mental Health
OSTP  Office of Science and Technology Programs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OTDA</td>
<td>Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFO</td>
<td>Principal Federal Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>Point of Dispensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOEM</td>
<td>State Office of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEOC</td>
<td>State Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Strategic National Stockpile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sector Specific Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>U.S. Public Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPU</td>
<td>NYS DEC Wildlife Pathology Unit</td>
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Attachment 5

NYS Governor’s Office of Employee Relations (GOER) Human Resources
Guidance Memorandum - 11/13/06
MEMORANDUM

November 13, 2006

TO: Directors of Human Resources

FROM: John V. Currier

SUBJECT: Agency Planning for a Pandemic Influenza Crisis

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidance to agencies that are developing Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) for use in the event of a pandemic influenza crisis. The Governor’s Office of Employee Relations (GOER) worked with the Department of Civil Service (DCS) to prepare this memorandum.

For information on preparation of COOPs, agencies should print and review both documents found under the heading Empire Agency Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) - Sample Plan on the State Office of Emergency Management (SOEM) web site at http://www.dhses.ny.gov/programs/planning/. For additional information on COOP preparation, agencies can contact the SOEM Planning Section at (518) 292-2302 (not a CAPNET number).

Since specific parameters of any future pandemic influenza crisis are impossible to predict, this memorandum provides a general overview of workforce issues that agencies should consider in establishing their plans. If a pandemic influenza crisis does occur, the SOEM, in conjunction with GOER, DCS and the Department of Health (DOH), will be providing more detailed guidance to agencies.
Because the State has broad statutory power and authority to define agency mission and goals and to manage its workforce, there are no legal impediments to its authority to do so during a pandemic influenza crisis. Moreover, there are no contractual impediments to the State’s ability to identify essential assignments or carry out any other necessary measures for managing its workforce during a pandemic influenza crisis.

While the State has broad authority to manage its workforce, cooperation and sharing of information with the unions during a pandemic crisis will be very important. Accordingly, GOER will work with DOH and DCS to coordinate meetings and establish ongoing communication with the unions.

The identification of critical assignments and the development of a strategy to staff them under difficult circumstances are essential elements in the development of each agency’s COOP. Set forth below is information on workforce issues to assist agencies with the development of such plans.

A. Identification of Critical Functions and Assignments

We recommend that agencies focus on the identification of critical functions needed during a pandemic influenza crisis and the assignments critical to the operation of those functions. After an agency’s plans for critical functions have been finalized, the agency should create a staffing plan identifying essential employees to carry out the critical assignments. In addition, planning should include identifying additional employees who could staff these critical assignments.

Identification of specific employees who could perform critical assignments far in advance of a possible pandemic influenza crisis may not be feasible given the fact that employees will continue to enter and leave the workforce between now and the onset of any pandemic. However, if identification of employees to perform critical assignments is needed as part of the planning process, agencies must plan to update such lists regularly to reflect staffing changes. Also, agencies should bear in mind that their critical functions could change unexpectedly in response to a crisis and should be prepared to re-evaluate their critical assignments accordingly.

The State has previously had occasion to identify critical functions that need to be maintained, albeit for different purposes. While such past experience is a good starting point, there is no guarantee that functions deemed critical in past incidents would be identical to those needed in the event of a pandemic crisis. Accordingly, agencies should re-evaluate their needs in the context of a pandemic influenza crisis that may exceed the scope and duration of previous crises.

To reiterate, the agency planning process must focus on critical assignments within critical functions. It cannot be simply title or employee-based.

B. Staffing

We have divided our staffing discussion into four topics: Essential Employees, Location of Assignments, Work at Home, and Non-Essential Employees.
1. **Essential employees**
During a pandemic influenza crisis, the paramount goal of agencies is to keep critical assignments staffed. Should essential employees become unable to continue in such assignments, there are a variety of tools that agencies could employ to fill them. Suggested tools an agency could use include:

a. Volunteers. The first choice should be to ask for volunteers from the pool of employees in the agency in the same title who are qualified and normally assigned to perform such duties. Second, volunteers willing to work out-of-title but qualified and competent to do the work could be sought and be temporarily reassigned by the agency.

b. Assignment to duty. When an agency cannot fill critical assignments through volunteers, employees in the agency in the same title who are qualified and normally assigned to perform such duties could be assigned to work.

c. Temporary reassignment of other employees. Within each appointing authority, management is entitled to reassign employees within the same layoff unit, as needed. If it becomes necessary to move employees from one appointing authority to another, transfer under Section 70(1) of the **Civil Service Law** (CSL) can be used as a mechanism to do so. Under the law, employees must consent to such a transfer.

d. Out of title. State employees who are assigned or volunteer to perform duties and functions of a title at a higher salary grade are working out of title, and should be paid appropriately. Those employees assigned to, or volunteering for, duties at a lower grade level should be held harmless. This will remain true even where employees are temporarily assigned to another agency. In preparation for a possible pandemic crisis, DOB and DCS will develop a streamlined payment mechanism for out-of-title work in advance. If use of such a payment mechanism becomes necessary, guidelines will be shared with agencies.

e. Former State employees. Retirees and former State employees can currently be rehired under **Retirement and Social Security Law** Sections 211 and 212, but these provisions impose income limits. There are also restrictions under the **Public Officers Law**. Should conditions warrant, the State may ease these restrictions. Any such modifications will be communicated to agencies when and if they become necessary.

f. Temporary items. The **Civil Service Law** provides for temporary appointments and allows the Director of Classification and Compensation to create and allocate positions (see **CSL** Sections 64 and 118, respectively). Using this authority, the Department of Civil Service and the Division of the Budget will work to establish in advance a pool of temporary items set at various compensation levels. This would allow agencies to acquire new employees rapidly as circumstances warrant. This pool of items could only be used with proper authorization. A procedure will be established for use of these items and communicated to agencies when and if this measure becomes necessary.

g. Contracting out. Although the State currently has the right to contract out for goods and services, this should be viewed as a last resort for filling critical assignments. A better alternative is to make temporary appointments as discussed above.
h. Compliance. Whenever possible, agencies should seek volunteers to perform critical assignments. Although employee behavior in a crisis environment, particularly one involving the threat of communicable disease, is unpredictable, State employees have historically shown dedication to their jobs by volunteering to work under difficult conditions.

Employee education and training will be carried out to prevent unfounded fears and combat rumors as well as to make employees aware of employer expectations. DOH, DCS, and GOER will coordinate the development of training (See Section D, Education and Training, below).

The disciplinary provisions found in Civil Service Law Section 75 and the collective bargaining agreements are available where employees do not report to work as directed. However, this is a lengthy process and would most likely not be effective in getting employees to report within the timeframes necessitated by a pandemic.

2. Location of Assignments
The location where an employee performs critical assignments depends, among other things, upon the nature of such assignments and the severity of the pandemic influenza crisis. Employees may always be assigned to perform work at their normal worksite. In addition, the State has the authority to assign employees to work at an alternate worksite or to work at home. The State has always had the authority to assign employees to work at home, and such work-at-home arrangements are not “telecommuting” as described in the PS&T Unit Agreement.

a. Housing and food. Agencies could plan for and provide food and housing for staff required to stay at or near their worksites. Similarly, the State could pay for hotel accommodations, food, and travel expenses for employees assigned to worksites away from their homes, but not staying at their worksites.

3. Work at Home
As stated above employees may be assigned to work at home during a pandemic influenza crisis. The State has always had the authority to assign employees to work at home. Such work-at-home arrangements are not “telecommuting” as described in the PS&T Unit Agreement and no labor/management agreement is necessary in order to assign employees to work at home. Employees who are assigned to work at home should, where possible, be performing their assigned duties or be available to do so during their normally scheduled work hours. Agencies that intend to assign employees to work at home must make logistical preparations in advance (i.e., technological infrastructure, equipment, supplies, etc.).

Employees assigned to work at home are in pay status and must complete a record of attendance. Direct deposit of pay should be encouraged so that employees assigned to work at home will have timely access to their funds.

There is no presumption that employees assigned to work at home are on standby/on-call status unless so notified by the employer. Standby/On-Call provisions of the collective bargaining agreements are only operative if the employee in question is required to restrict activities or movement during non-work hours for the express purpose of being ready to work on short
notice. Similarly, there is no presumption that employees assigned to work at home are working overtime unless so assigned by the employer.

Detailed guidelines regarding work at home issues will be developed and shared with agencies when and if this measure becomes necessary.

4. Non-Essential Employees
While agencies will always strive to ensure performance of critical functions, the extent to which they curtail other non-essential functions will likely depend upon the severity of the pandemic influenza crisis. If the severity of the crisis results in a decision to direct non-essential employees not to report to the work place, such employees are in pay status without charge to credits because we are precluding them from reporting to work. Accordingly, under this scenario, they would be assigned to work at home (See “Work at Home” above). Such work-at-home arrangements are not “telecommuting” as described in the PS&T Unit Agreement. Non-essential employees who are assigned to work at home should, where possible, be performing their assigned duties or be available to do so during their normally scheduled work hours. Non-essential employees who typically earn overtime will not be compensated for the loss of opportunity to do so as a result of assignment to duty at home.

C. Budgetary/Fiscal and Overtime Issues

Under Civil Service Law Section 134(6), the Director of the Budget has authority to approve waivers allowing overtime payments to employees deemed to be overtime ineligible. This has been done in previous situations including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the preparation for Y2K. The Division of the Budget will establish an expedited process for granting overtime waivers to essential employees in the event of a pandemic influenza crisis. Guidelines on this process will be shared with agencies when and if this measure becomes necessary.

D. Education and Training

DOH, DCS, and GOER will coordinate education and training programs. Programs for the general employee population will focus on specific infection control practices and reducing staff fear and anxiety through education about influenza and its prevention. In addition, informational sessions geared toward personnel and/or human resource managers will focus on topics related to management of the workforce during a pandemic influenza crisis.

E. Internal Agency Communication

Since communication with employees will be crucial in sustaining the execution of critical assignments, agencies must ensure that their records regarding employee home phone numbers (and home e-mail addresses where possible) are up to date. Agencies should establish an emergency communication plan and advise employees on its use. Once the agency COOP planning process is complete, agencies should conduct agency-level informational sessions with union representatives and employees to explain agency plans in the event of a pandemic.
F. Next Steps

In the event of a pandemic influenza crisis, SOEM, in conjunction with GOER, DCS, and DOH, will provide more detailed instructions to agency managers on the issues discussed above as well as other contingencies that may arise.

If you have any questions about this memorandum, please contact Rebecca Caudle or Richard Ahl of the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations at (518) 473-8375.

/jpc