New York State
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION #6
MASS CARE, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, HOUSING, AND HUMAN SERVICES ANNEX

Mass Care Appendix

Prepared by the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission

March 2022
Plan Revision History/Record of Distribution

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Executive Summary/Policy
The mission of the State of New York, the Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC), and Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6 are to provide leadership, coordination, and support for efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents that require a State mass care response. ESF #6 consists of 16 DPC agencies, as well as numerous non-DPC agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which function under a hierarchical management structure. In times of disaster, State Agencies will be used to augment local resources by providing and administering programs with the focus of responding quickly and compassionately to the needs of disaster survivors.

Comprehensive Approach
At the State level, coordinating the delivery of mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human services are vital roles in the State’s response. The objective of ESF #6 and the Mass Care Appendix is to minimize the impact of disasters on populations by quickly and efficiently providing comprehensive services through the integration of the Whole Community approach, therefore maintaining the focus on individual preparedness and community engagement to enhance resiliency.

Management Responsibilities and Authority
Disasters have the potential to exhaust resources at the local level, which warrants support from the State to effectively respond to the event. Local government mass care resources will likely be overwhelmed, and the State may need to provide additional assistance to support local efforts, including sheltering for all populations, feeding, bulk distribution of relief items, and family reunification. Federal assistance may be required to augment local and State efforts in providing mass care relief, as the need for assistance may surpass both local and State resources.
Section I: General Considerations and Planning Guidelines

1. Introduction
The State of New York experiences a wide variety of disasters and emergencies that may result in loss of life, damage, destruction of property, and negatively affect community members. Potential community disasters can be a result of natural or human-caused emergencies which pose challenges in sheltering, feeding, family reunification, and distributing emergency supplies to people who have been impacted by an emergency or disaster. Disasters have the potential to exhaust resources at the local level and warrant support from the State, or possibly the Federal government, to effectively respond to the event. At the State level, coordinating mass care operations include sheltering, feeding, distribution of emergency supplies, and family reunification. This Mass Care Appendix is intended to provide information, guidance, and a process for coordinating available State, Federal, and NGO resources to support local mass care operations through the response and recovery phases.

2. Purpose
The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) has been structured into three distinct, but interconnected volumes. These are:
- Volume 1: All-Hazard Mitigation Plan
- Volume 2: Response and Short-Term Recovery
- Volume 3: Long-Term Recovery Plan

The purpose of the State CEMP is to identify the State’s overarching policies, authorities, and response organizational structure that will be implemented in an emergency or disaster situation that warrants a State response. The State CEMP serves as the foundational framework for the State’s response levels and serves as the operational basis of which other functional and hazard-specific annexes are built upon. These annexes address a broad range of consequences to respond to the State’s highest rated hazards and include ESF #6. This is an Appendix to the ESF #6 Functional Annex.

The purpose of this Appendix is to ensure that ESF #6 can adequately prepare for and provide mass care support to an affected population; inclusive of life-sustaining and human services resources such as hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergencies supplies. Further, this Appendix identifies the key mechanisms in coordinating with the local response and identifies the lines of coordination to interoperate with the Federal ESF #6 via the National Response Framework (NRF).

3. Scope
This Appendix applies to any incident that warrants mass care support from the State of New York. This Appendix applies to ESF #6 and authorities that may be directed to respond to such an incident. Response operations requiring mass care resources will encompass the efforts identified in this appendix and utilize existing State capabilities. Further, this Appendix
acknowledges that local and State ESF #6 response capabilities and this plan may be exceeded, necessitating the use of Federal ESF #6 agencies and resources.

4. Situation
New York State experiences many natural and human caused disasters annually. From coastal storms, flooding, winter storms, or pandemics, the State must be prepared to respond to assist with mass care operations when local government mass care resources are overwhelmed. Over 19 million people reside in New York State, with many demographic profiles spanning both rural and urban areas of the State. The State, and/or the Federal government, depending on the severity and scope on the incident(s), may need to provide additional assistance to support local efforts, including sheltering for all populations, feeding, bulk distribution of relief items, and family reunification.

Past events in the State of New York have required large-scale mass care operations. These events have become lessons and examples on how to improve response and recovery efforts for future incidents.

- On September 11, 2001, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred throughout the United States. Two hijacked planes crashed into the North and South towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, resulting in the towers collapse. The toxic chemical cloud and dust from the collapse and burning at ground zero became a major decontamination concern of hospitals and shelters for potential victims.
- In June 2006, storms and flooding in Central and Southeastern New York resulted in significant power outages, destruction of hundreds of homes, evacuations of thousands of residents, and the closure of hundreds of miles of roadways.
- In August 2007, severe storms and tornadoes caused more than three inches of rain within a few hours in New York City and Staten Island, with tornadoes recorded in Brooklyn and Staten Island.
- In 2011, Hurricane Irene resulted in power outages in almost 640,000 homes and business in NYC, with approximately 3 million people without electricity in New York and Connecticut.
- Within one week of Hurricane Irene, Tropical Storm Lee hit New York State. Between the two storms, 198 shelters housed 18,000 citizens.
- During Tropical Storm Lee, over 20,000 residents were forced to evacuate Broome County.
- As a result of Hurricane Irene, several streams and rivers overflowed in Schoharie County, leaving over 1,000 residents displaced and public infrastructure destroyed. Schoharie County then sustained further damage a week later from Tropical Storm Lee. Flooding occurred again in 2013, where the school was cut off from transportation routes due to impassible roads. School children were sheltered in place in the school until it was safe.
- During Superstorm Sandy in 2012, fire stations and other public buildings became last resort shelters, with firefighters tasked to manage the shelters and provide mass care support in poorly equipped facilities for mass care needs or comfort while attempting to perform their first responder duties. Some facilities were too crowded or lacked basic services such as electricity, water, and sewer. Other facilities were within the flooded areas and needed to be evacuated, causing the loss of materials and resources.
- In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy displaced hundreds of thousands of people across New York State. The American Red Cross (ARC) provided more than 74,000 overnight stays in ARC shelters, 17 million meals and snacks, and delivered food, blankets, health care, emotional support, and critical relief supplies throughout the Greater New York region.
• In November 2014, heavy, wet lake effect snow in Western New York caused thousands of trees and powerlines to break and fall resulting in homes and business being without power for days, forcing hundreds of people to seek emergency shelter. Fire departments and police departments became last resort shelters. The combined 7 feet of snow, as a result of two storms, led to abandoned vehicles, thousands of stranded motorists, food and gas shortages, accounts of looting, and at least 13 deaths.

• A Halloween storm in 2019 dropped record-breaking rain across Western, Northern, and Upstate New York causing widespread flooding, while high winds knocked out power to over 200,000 residents. Several residents had to be evacuated from their homes and cleanup activities took several weeks.

• During the pandemic response to Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 in 2020, the need for non-congregate sheltering was considered. Many State and local partners worked with the State and Federal government to identify surge locations in the event non-congregate sheltering was required. It was determined that any shelter site can undergo augmentation, to include ensuring appropriate social distancing, sanitizing, temperature checks, etc. Additionally during the COVID-19 response, operations ensued to ensure that various New York food banks had adequate food and supplies to assist New Yorkers in need.

Disasters are inclusive of diversity, affecting persons regardless of race, religious beliefs, ethnicity, age, gender, physical abilities, political beliefs, or socio-economic status. Additional social or physical barriers may exist for people that are considered at-risk populations. This includes individuals or groups whose needs are not fully addressed by traditional service providers or who feel they cannot comfortably or safely use the standard resources offered during preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program 2016 definitions identified at-risk groups to include people who are physically or mentally disabled (e.g., blind, deaf, hard-of-hearing, have learning disabilities, mental illness and/or mobility limitations), people with limited English language skills, individuals who are geographically and/or culturally isolated, people who are homeless, senior citizens, and/or children.

5. Planning Assumptions

• The identification, activation, operation, and demobilization of temporary emergency shelters in response to an emergency or disaster are primarily the responsibility of each county and local officials working in partnership with the ARC.

• Local government mass care resources will likely be overwhelmed, and the State may need to provide additional assistance to support local efforts, including sheltering for all populations, feeding, bulk distribution of relief items, and family reunification.

• Federal assistance may be required to augment local and State efforts in providing mass care relief, as the need for assistance may surpass both local and State resources.

• Based on the severity of the emergency or event, delays may occur at all levels of government in obtaining resources and supplies to support local sheltering and mass care operations.

• Should predesignated local disaster shelter sites be destroyed or become inoperable by the disaster, alternate shelter sites will be identified that may need to be located outside the impacted area.

• Many pre-existing shelter facilities are public school buildings or community centers that are most readily accessible to populations within those communities. Facilities designated as shelters may or may not be equipped with an emergency generator to provide power to critical building systems.

• Shelters and other facilities utilized in mass care activities will be required to be compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and meet the needs of
individuals with Access and Functional Needs (AFN). Individuals and families may have specific needs which may not be immediately apparent or recognized at the time of the emergency, such as specific dietary needs, conditions that affect communication, limited English proficiency, disabilities, or chronic medical conditions that require a need to coordinate with ESF #8 to support medical or mental health needs. Most individuals with AFN, including individuals with disabilities, can be supported in a general population shelter environment through provision of materials.

- During an emergency, spontaneous and unanticipated shelters and/or feeding sites may open. The State will work with these local and not-for-profit partners to promote ADA-compliance. Spontaneous sites may not have adequate resources to sustain operations and request assistance through county or State resources.
- The State will work with local and not-for-profit partners to promote ADA-compliance. Upon arrival at the shelter, support, and any additional resources (equipment, services, personnel, etc.) will be identified for populations with AFN to maintain health, safety, and independence.
- Family reunification activities may be necessary should family members become separated or should unaccompanied minors arrive at shelters or other service sites.
- Persons arriving at shelters may arrive with their service animals and/or domestic/companion pets. County government has the general responsibility for developing the capacity to provide appropriate veterinary/companion animal sheltering services during an emergency situation, with coordination from ESF #11.
- Person arriving at shelters may have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. Appropriate decontamination/treatment of individuals and pets may need to be addressed prior to entrance. Coordination may be needed with other ESFs, such as ESFs #4, 8, 10, and 11.
- Adequate food, water, sewer systems, and emergency supplies might not be available. It is the responsibility of the meal site to communicate what physical resources are available at that site. Food requirements will be identified by availability/delivery/consumption method. Congregate feeding sites or mobile feeding routes may need to be identified.
- Security may be required to support shelters and/or recovery centers, requiring coordination with ESF #13.
- ESF #6 will work with ESF #8 for recommended guidance for internal and external cleaning/disinfecting of shelter facilities, including any transportation to/from the shelter, to limit the spread of disease.
- There may be limitations to the types and availability of shelters. Congregate and non-congregate sheltering options may need augmentation for social distancing and spacing restrictions.
- Mass care response activities will continue until shelters are shut down when people either go home or transition to temporary housing.
- Mass care response activities may transition to recovery activities as the needs may change as people begin to repair the damage from the incident.

6. Concept of Operations
The concept of operations listed below is based on incidents that occur and warrants a response from the State. It follows the concept of a credible worst-case scenario of a significant disaster that initiates a mass care response.

- An incident occurs that warrants the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and has been identified as needing a potential mass care response.
The identification, activation, and operation of temporary emergency shelters in response to an emergency is primarily the responsibility of county and local officials working in partnership with the ARC.

State Office of Emergency Management (State OEM) will notify other appropriate DPC agency representatives, which may include the activation of ESF #6.

If conditions warrant the activation of ESF #6, ESF #6 will augment local resources by providing food and shelter, temporary housing, family reunification, counseling and information services, links to financial assistance, distribution of emergency supplies, and/or support for unmet needs.

The Governor could exercise gubernatorial authority in declaring a State Disaster Emergency. In doing so, the Governor may direct any and all State Agencies, including non-DPC agencies, to provide assistance under the coordination of the DPC.

The State OEM will coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies, as needed, and will coordinate with Federal ESF #6, as needed.

Mass care response activities may transition to short or long-term recovery activities, or mitigation measures may be identified to reduce the impacts of future incidents.

7. Authorities or Policies
The authority to develop this Appendix and implement specific response actions to effectively respond to mass care needs can be found in a variety of New York State Laws, regulations, and Federal authorities, including but not limited to:

State Authorities
- NYS Executive Law – Article 2-B State and Local Natural and Man-made Disaster Preparedness
  - Section 21 State Disaster Preparedness Commission; powers and duties
  - Section 25 Use of Local Government Resources in a Disaster
  - Section 28 State Declaration of Disaster Emergency
- NYS Executive Law – Article 18 NYS Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code Act
- NYS Executive Law – Article 22 Office of Victim Services
- NYS Executive Law – Article 23 Fair Treatment Standards for Crime Victims
- 9 NYCRR 525 Practice and Procedure before the Office of Victim Services
- 18 NYCRR 491 Shelter for Adults
- 18 NYCRR 900 Shelter for Families
- 18 NYCRR 485 General Provisions
- 18 NYCRR 352.3 Rent Allowances
- Executive Order #26 of 1996 and #26.1 of 2006 as amended (NYS Adoption of the Incident Command System)
- NYS Civil Rights Law - Ag&Mkts 353B Appropriate shelter for dogs left outdoors

Federal Authorities
- The National Emergencies Act
- Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act
- Section 1135 of the Social Security Act
- Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
- The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013
- 7 USC 2131-2156 Animal Welfare Act
- 42 USC Code 3001 Congressional declaration of objectives
- 42 USC Code 68 Disaster relief
• 42 USC Code 5151 Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance
• 42 USC Code 5177 Unemployment assistance
• 42 USC Code 5189(a) Appeals of assistance decisions
• 42 USC Code 10601 Crime Victims fund
• 42 USC 5152, sec 309 (a) and (b) (Federally recognizes the Salvation Army as a Disaster Relief Organization)
• 2006 PETS Act
• Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) guidelines
• Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288
• Code of Federal Regulations, 20 CFR, Part 625 Disaster unemployment assistance
• Code of Federal Regulations, 44 CFR Emergency management and assistance
• National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)
• National Response Framework (NRF)

8. Appendix Maintenance, Distribution, and Revision Process
The State OEM Planning Section has the responsibility for the development, review, and maintenance of all multi-agency response plans under the State CEMP. As required under New York State Executive Law Article 2-B, each plan shall undergo an annual review, update, and be posted online (if applicable) no later than March 31 of each year.

During the annual review by the Planning Section for its material, this Appendix is examined for both content and format. For updates that do not impact operational mechanisms or processes, the appropriate edits are initiated within the Planning Section and do not warrant external involvement. Appendix updates will also be conducted based upon experiences and lessons learned from exercises or real-world events, or through administrative changes in government. Planning Section updates and/or edits affecting operational capabilities, responsibilities, or otherwise impacting operations will engage stakeholders in a variety of ways, such as verbally, by document review, meetings, webinars, or any combination thereof. Final drafts will be socialized to all appropriate agencies/personnel upon completion.
Section II: Preparedness

1. Mitigation
Volume 1 of the State CEMP is the State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Pursuant to the requirements of 44 CFR 201.4, the State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan is required to focus on natural hazards that are likely to substantially impact the State. Mitigation planning efforts for technological and human-caused hazards are also recognized and are being implemented throughout the State CEMP. Volume 1 addresses the overall State hazard mitigation planning process, risk assessment, strategy development, and plan maintenance. The State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan was Federally approved by DHS/FEMA in December 2018 and is in effect for five years. Each county has a FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plan.

2. Planning and Risk Assessment
A variety of mechanisms are used to understand the various risks and associated threats and hazards facing the State. As required by the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), the State must complete an annual Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA). The process involves the identification of scenarios that will most stress the State’s capabilities and an assessment of those capabilities. Those capabilities are mapped to the core capabilities in each of these ESF Annexes created under the State CEMP. Further, New York State has developed additional programs and methodologies to better understand risk at the local level. This includes a County Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA), which the State has conducted in each of the 57 counties of New York and New York City. Counties also participate in their own CEPA to help understand their risks. CEPA provides great insight as to the State’s risk profile from a local level perspective. The CEPA does address each county’s response capabilities for mass care and sheltering.

3. Testing, Training, and Exercising
The State of New York sponsors and conducts a variety of training to improve response capability. This includes varying levels of training in the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Professional Development Series (PDS) curriculum. The State also participates in a wide variety of specialized training, including training to meet Federal program and grant requirements. Additionally, many State agencies identify training requirements within their own organization to meet the needs of the agency for that specific discipline. The State of New York has incorporated the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) into its emergency management program. HSEEP consists of both doctrine and policy for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating exercises.

The State also utilizes an exercise component as part of the planning process to test the effectiveness of an emergency management plan. These exercises vary in scope and cross several state-level plans or annexes. As a point of reference, the planning process that resulted in the creation of all of the State’s ESF annexes included an exercise component. Agencies may conduct additional training on their own.

4. After Action Reports (AAR) and Corrective Actions Programs (CAP)
Following an exercise or an actual event, an After-Action Report (AAR) should be completed by all staff involved in the event. The information gathered in the AAR will provide insight into future refinement of this appendix. AARs will be completed as soon as possible following any relevant exercise and will be facilitated by the State OEM for plan updates, ideally at the end of the exercise. The AAR should be completed as soon as possible following the deactivation of the State EOC. For example, in response to the Halloween storms and flooding in 2019, State OEM...
coordinated an AAR with all staff and agencies involved, resulting in a Corrective Action Program initiated by State OEM.

5. Stockpiles, Supplies, or Specialized Equipment
The State has available stockpiles, supplies, resources, and/or specialized equipment that directly support ESF #6 and mass care operations. Additionally, the State has a list of the capabilities of State Agencies to assist in the areas of access and functional needs, arrangements for school and work, caregiver support, childcare, communications, compensation, food, housing, medical care, pet care, pharmacy, psycho-social needs, security, social diversion, staging areas, transportation, and utility support.

6. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Letters of Agreement (LOAs)
The ARC/State MOU was signed on 4/2/2021 and is in effect for five years.

The Salvation Army is specifically identified in The Stafford Act (42 USC 5152) as a Federally Recognized Disaster Relief Organization and has National Level MOUs in place with FEMA, the American Red Cross, National VOAD, Southern Baptist Convention, ARRL, America’s Second Harvest, Mennonite Disaster Services, the Civil Air Patrol, Moose International, Kiwanis International, etc.

The 59 Area Agencies on Aging (AAA) signed and agree to Standard Assurances with State Office for the Aging (SOFA) affirming their participation in local disaster preparedness.
Section III: Response

1. Alert, Notification, and Activation
The response to an incident may be adequate using only local resources or it may be one that necessitates or warrants a State response. As such, State involvement may be initiated in a variety of ways as various mechanisms are in place to serve as conduits to the request, acquisition, and deployment of State assistance. Several State agencies continuously operate their own warning points, operational centers, dispatch centers, or reporting systems that receive field requests for State assistance in addition to the daily operating needs. Pursuant to Federal, State, executive, and agency-specific protocols, these systems are routinely used for notifications of significant or reportable events and/or make emergency notifications to State personnel. Included among these is the New York State Watch Center (SWC). State assistance is often provided through these reception points which become more centralized under an overall State response upon activation of the State EOC.

2. Emergency Response Levels
Mass care needs occur as a direct result of an incident. Local government serves as the front line of defense and has the primary responsibility to respond to emergencies within their jurisdiction. Such primacy exists at all levels of government throughout New York State, with jurisdictions dependent on the State to support response activities, as warranted. The State OEM, through consultation with the Governor’s Office, will direct and implement State response activities as identified in the State CEMP. Depending on the nature and scope of the incident or event, participation from state agencies may vary.

The SWC serves as the focal point for receiving or providing notification of incidents in the State. In response to an incident that warrants an increase in State response posture, the SWC will be used to notify agencies that the State EOC is activating.

As identified in the State CEMP Volume 2 and the ESF #6 Annex, the State EOC maintains several activation levels based upon event severity and the overall level or volume of State response operations. These levels are indicated in response to a specific hazard or threat and include a host of operational functions and mechanisms. Those functions may be broad in scope, or may be narrow, such as providing assistance in mass care management and support.

The following levels of activation outline the operational steps the State may take in responding to any event. The inclusion of mass care response mechanisms is identified, where indicated. In addition, mass care mechanisms for no-notices events (e.g. terrorism or transportation accident) are included in almost all response levels. Additionally, Attachment 4 outlines the Mass Care Response Intervals.

Steady State: The SWC actively monitors reports and incidents that occur across the State as part of their Daily Operations. Should an incident occur that meets the criteria as a mass care incident, the SWC will follow the reporting mechanisms noted in their Standard Operating Guide (SOG).

Level 4 Enhanced Monitoring: A small, isolated, or potential event that has some indicators that warrant extra attention, enhanced monitoring, or external communication.

- State OEM staff only.
- Agencies may be asked individually to provide support through remote operations or report from their home agency.
Level 3 Partial Activation: An incident or event requiring a partial activation of the State EOC, with ESF coordinating agency activation.

- ESF #6 agencies will be determined at the time of the event.

Level 2 Full Activation: An incident requiring full activation of the State EOC, with ESF activation.

- Most, if not all, ESF #6 member agencies will be activated.

Level 1 Full State/Federal Response: An incident requiring full activation of the State EOC, with ESF activation, and Federal ESF integration and coordination.

- All ESF #6 member agencies will be activated.
- The activities of ESF #6 will be integrated with those of their Federal ESF #6 counterparts.

3. Direction and Control
The State endorses the development of one response organizational structure that will include all responding agencies. State agencies and ESFs will be organized under the framework of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) ICS as required by Executive Order 26.1 of 2006 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. As such, a variety of direction and control components may be utilized to manage and coordinate the State’s resources in an efficient and effective manner and to provide the interoperability between the local and Federal response organizations.

The organizational structure of the State’s ESF# 6 is similar to the Federal construct under the NRF. State ESF #6 will be situated organizationally in the Operations Section, and report directly to the Operation Section Chief (OSC) or Human Services Branch Director, if established. The ESF Coordinating Agency will be the primary interface with the OSC and the member agencies of the ESF. All requests for assistance will be managed through the OSC to the ESF Coordinating Agency for availability of resources/missions. The ESF Coordinating Agency will be given latitude to facilitate the best resource or solution set in response to the request that the State has received. Concurrence of that solution will be confirmed to the OSC to ensure the State maintains a centralized coordination of resources and direction for requests for assistance.

ESF #6 will provide incident management support and coordination under the ESF Coordinating Agency. The ESF Coordinating Agency will ensure the activities of the ESF are consistent with this Appendix, and that agencies are operating in unison to achieve the common goal or mission of the ESF.

ESF #6 core mission group facilitators will coordinate requests/missions and provide status reports related to the specific core mission they are facilitating.

4. Assignment of Responsibilities
This section reviews existing roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of local and state governments and agencies.

Local Government
Local government will be actively involved in mass care response and operations, to the fullest extent possible. Each county, and many local governments, has a CEMP which provides the framework for the jurisdiction’s response to emergencies and disasters. Each locally developed
plan will differ in its implementation, including in response capabilities, surge capacities, and in the ability to exercise authorities. Each State OEM Regional Staff have pre-identified a local point of contact for each county that will coordinate local mass care efforts and act as a primary point of contact.

State Government
ESF #6 will coordinate mass care operations. Agencies may not have a specific role and responsibility in Mass Care, however responsibilities outside the Mass Care and ESF #6 framework may overlap with the agency’s capabilities to assist in Mass Care operations.

5. Integration of Federal ESFs
The Federal Government organizes its response resources and capabilities under an ESF construct. Like New York State’s ESF construct, Federal ESFs are multi-agency operational components that serve as the primary means for coordinating Federal resources and capabilities into New York State. The Federal ESFs bring together a wealth of capabilities of Federal departments and agencies and other national-level assets. In doing so, they are organized to provide the operating structure for building, sustaining, and delivering Federal response core capabilities in support of the State’s Critical Capabilities. Integration and coordination are key to leveraging the resources of each Federal ESF. As such, the State ESF #6 will serve at the primary integration point for Federal ESF #6 when coordinating mass care operational needs.
Section IV: Recovery/Demobilization

1. Overview
Dependent on the severity of the event or incident, type of destruction or damage, and the needs of the affected communities and individuals, the response to such an event may be short-lived or could extend for a prolonged period of time, perhaps even years. There is no clear delineation of when disaster response activities transition into short-term recovery activities. In general, disaster response addresses the immediate life-safety concerns and incident stabilizing efforts, while short-term recovery activities begin as the need for immediate life-saving activities diminish resulting in response activities focused on the individual and less toward the masses.

2. Short-Term Recovery
A variety of forces may influence the direction of the recovery process. Considerations that have to be analyzed for an effective response and prompt recovery include the safety of responders, repair and reopening of critical transportation routes, remoteness of areas, and the needs and requirements for the restoration of utility systems, housing, and food distribution.

Regardless of the extent of damage, the State of New York will strive to assist local governments, businesses, and citizens in recovering from the impacts of any emergency. The goals of recovery will be to provide mass care services, as warranted, to meet the disaster-caused needs of the local government, businesses, and citizens. This may be done by helping to build resilience, connecting individuals with community or personal resources, and helping others understand the recovery process. ESF #6 has agencies that may be able to provide financial assistance, resources, mass care items, advocacy, information, services, in-the-field resources, multi-agency resource centers, or help people in shelters transition to short or long-term housing options.

Where possible, hazard mitigation measures will be incorporated into recovery activities to lessen the impact of reoccurrence or eliminate it entirely.

3. Demobilization
All efforts will be made to transition from the State’s support to shelters and feeding operations back to local and county emergency response partners and/or work to merge spontaneous shelter operations with pre-identified shelter locations.

Demobilization of agencies and ESF #6 from the State EOC will occur based upon operational needs and will be jointly determined by State OEM and the ESF #6 Coordinating Agency. Based upon the needs of the mass care operation, ESF #6 agencies may begin to demobilize during the response/short-term recovery phase. However, it should be noted that agencies may be subject to a rapid recall for reactivation of ESF #6, if needed, based upon operational needs. There may be instances where ESF #6 can be partially demobilized, allowing member agencies to be released as the need for their representation and capability in that ESF is no longer necessary.

In the process of demobilizing ESF #6, all member agencies must ensure that any open or ongoing activities that require cross-coordination with other ESFs are closed out prior to demobilizing. This must be done in a manner to ensure that any dependencies or interdependencies of that ESF are properly and effectively communicated across the response organization. In addition, each agency must ensure that they coordinate their demobilization with their agency-specific counterparts that are represented on other ESFs.

If a Joint Field Office (JFO) activation occurs, the Federal government will transition out of the ESF construct and implement the Recovery Support Functions (RSFs). As the Federal ESFs
transition to RSFs, the State’s ESF posture will be required to transition into the RSF construct. As such, State Agencies will transition from their assigned ESF role to the appropriate RSF, as warranted.