



Office of Counter Terrorism

**Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan
Guidance**



May 2024

Educate, Disrupt, Mitigate.

Foreword: A Letter from the Office of Counter Terrorism Director

This guidance is intended to help your jurisdiction build upon the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan it submitted to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services' Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit (DTPU) last year.

The following pages are a culmination of the latest research, expert insights, practical experience, *and ideas that you and your colleagues have brought forward*, which should serve as a roadmap for augmenting and refining the Plans that were previously submitted.

Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) is foundational to nearly all those Plans. We continue to emphasize the importance of developing and maturing effective TAM teams tailored to your specific jurisdiction to disrupt acts of mass violence *before* they occur. The DTPU has worked throughout New York State to assist Jurisdictions with operationalizing these teams, and to provide resources, guidance, and training when invited to do so. We look forward to continuing these important partnerships going forward.

The safety and security of individuals and communities are paramount. Accordingly, the importance of proactive and evidence-based approaches to preventing targeted violence cannot be overstated. Our objective must be continuous improvement and we therefore ask all Jurisdictions to embrace ongoing self-assessment and planning refinement. We encourage you to use this as an opportunity for reevaluation and to adapt your prevention strategies to changing circumstances, emerging threats, and new research. These Plans, and the process of working as a team to develop them, help equip Jurisdictions with the knowledge and tools required to avoid, disrupt, and – if necessary – recover from an act of mass violence. They are another step towards developing comprehensive strategies to counter the complex and multifaceted challenges posed by perpetrators of targeted violence and domestic terrorism.

We are committed to working collectively towards safer communities and a more secure New York and we look forward to receiving your updated Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan by June 01, 2025.

Sincerely,

Ben Voce-Gardner

Director, Office of Counter Terrorism

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Introduction

Following the May 14, 2022, domestic terror attack inspired by white supremacist ideology at the Tops Friendly Markets grocery store in the East Side Neighborhood of Buffalo, NY, Governor Hochul issued Executive Order No. 18, “Preventing and Responding to Domestic Terrorism” (EO 18). EO 18 created the [Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit \(DTPU\)](#), a new unit within the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services’ (DHSES) Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT) dedicated to preventing domestic terrorism and targeted violence.

Pursuant to EO 18, each New York State County, and the City of New York (referred to as jurisdictions throughout this document), must develop and maintain a Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan (DTPP or Plan) to identify and confront threats of domestic terrorism. Jurisdictions were highly encouraged to use multidisciplinary behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) teams as a component of their DTPP. The evolving threat environment and increasing frequency of targeted violence requires a shift in prevention strategy, with renewed emphasis on holistic prevention efforts that include using both public health and public safety-based interventions, as appropriate. This requires purposely engaging a broad and diverse set of stakeholders to ensure the safety and well-being of New York State.

Each jurisdiction submitted a DTPP for 2022, and the DTPU closely reviewed each Plan. Based upon these submissions, the DTPU released a document titled *Best Practices - New York State Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans* in April 2023, highlighting the work of jurisdictions and the best practices they identified. This guidance document builds upon the initial DTPP submissions and that *Best Practices* document. The guidance is designed to strengthen the next cycle of DTPPs and jurisdictional approaches to preventing targeted violence, including terrorism (both foreign and domestic), hate crimes, mass killings, and other premeditated violent acts against a specific individual, group, or organization based on an ideological or grievance-based motivation.

To assist in this process, \$10 million in grant funding was provided through the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Jurisdictions have already utilized this funding to advance a broad range of targeted violence prevention-related activities involving planning, training, exercises, and staffing. Additional funding will be available in the upcoming Fiscal Year. **Jurisdictions must submit an updated DTPP prior to June 01, 2025, to be eligible for future funding opportunities.**

This guidance is intended to assist jurisdictions in updating their DTPP before the June 01, 2025, submission deadline by providing a brief background on targeted violence prevention efforts in the State, how they relate to domestic terrorism prevention, new considerations and prompts for updating the DTPP based on the 2022 initial Plan review, suggestions for how to structure DTPPs, and selected example documents such as the TAM team Primer. This guidance is structured to reflect the [2023 New York State Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy](#). The DTPU will use the DTPPs to help inform future planning efforts and program offerings, as well as domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention related grant opportunities.

DTPPs should be tailored to the respective jurisdiction and include input from a range of multidisciplinary stakeholders (law enforcement, mental and behavioral health professionals, and education officials, as well as others appropriate for the jurisdiction) and, if applicable, include the jurisdictions’ multidisciplinary Threat

Assessment and Management (TAM) teams.¹ Plans must cover all areas within the geographic boundaries of a jurisdiction, and jurisdictions may choose to work together to develop regional plans.

This guidance is organized into four main sections, modeled upon the *2023 New York State Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy*, which can also be used to structure the DTPP. Each section includes a series of questions to be addressed in each DTPP.

- **Jurisdictional Profile:** consider local threats, unique characteristics, information sharing networks, and highlight the status of your efforts.
- **Educate:** discuss how you are increasing community awareness about targeted violence and domestic terrorism and note trainings that you have received or intend to receive.
- **Disrupt:** include information on your TAM team and efforts to facilitate bystander reporting as a means of disrupting individuals on the Pathway to Violence.
- **Mitigate:** consider measures taken to reduce the impacts of targeted violence and domestic terrorism in your community, including target hardening, safety planning, and recovery.

Additionally, the DTPU is available to conduct voluntary Working Sessions in each jurisdiction to assist with the development of updated DTPPs. Attendees at the local level should include the TAM team lead, core members of that TAM team or Domestic Terrorism Prevention planning group, and the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant coordinator. Representatives of the DTPU will facilitate a collaborative discussion around each of the topics in this Plan guidance, share ideas for incorporation into your Plan, and provide a written report that captures key points from the session that can be used to update the DTPP.

The development and maintenance of DTPPs are central to the prevention of targeted violence and domestic terrorism in jurisdictions across New York State. Please direct questions regarding your DTPP to your DTPU regional representative or to PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov.

¹ Per E.O. 18, this guidance refers to these teams as TAM teams, recognizing that teams have different names (e.g., Threat Assessment Group, Threat Assessment Committee, Behavioral Intervention Team, Behavioral Assessment Team, Threat Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Group), but all share similar goals and functions.

Background

According to the US Department of Homeland Security, lone offenders and small groups motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and personal grievances pose a persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland.

Domestic violent extremists (DVEs) are assessed to be the primary threat, with racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVEs) and anti-government anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVEs) posing the greatest present threat given their lethality and frequency of attacks and plots. DVEs with hybrid ideological beliefs that do not fit into traditional categories continue to emerge, perpetuated by the online environment and conspiracy theories.

Foreign terrorist organizations – such as al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State, and their affiliates – maintain interest in conducting large scale attacks against the US; however, counter terrorism operations have degraded their capability to conduct such attacks against the US homeland. Instead, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by, but acting independently of, foreign terrorist organizations remain the most likely international terrorism related threat to the US homeland and NYS.

Likely targets of potential violence include, but are not limited to, mass gatherings, critical infrastructure, faith-based institutions, individuals, or events associated with the LGBTQIA+ community, schools, racial and ethnic minorities, and government facilities and personnel – including law enforcement. Recent international events have had direct impacts here in New York State, including the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has led to a surge in online hate speech.

To address the growing threat of domestic terrorism and targeted violence, New York State developed the *2023 Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy*.² This Strategy, and its three core goals, informed and shaped the guidance provided below. As such, the information presented below is divided into three operational objectives:

1. **Educate** stakeholders and the public, and share information on preventing targeted violence and domestic terrorism;
2. **Disrupt** targeted violence and domestic terrorism through effective early intervention, programs, and initiatives; and
3. **Mitigate** the potential impacts of targeted violence and domestic terrorism to the greatest extent possible.

CONNECTION BETWEEN TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

The US Secret Service’s (USSS) National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) defines targeted violence as a “*premeditated act of violence directed at a specific individual, group, or location, regardless of motivation and generally unrelated to other criminal activity.*” **All terrorism is targeted violence, but not all targeted violence is terrorism.** However, the efforts used to prevent domestic terrorism are also applicable to other types of targeted violence. For the purposes of this guidance, targeted violence includes all types of terrorism (both foreign and domestic), hate crimes, mass killings, and other premeditated violent acts against a specific individual, group, or organization.

The premeditated nature of targeted violence allows time for potential early intervention opportunities through behavioral threat assessment and management. Many individuals engaging in targeted violence tend to move

² Available at <https://www.dhses.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2023/04/2023-nys-tvp-strategy.pdf>

along an identifiable pathway before initiating an attack. This Pathway to Violence often begins with a real or perceived grievance based on ideological, personal, or other factors such as biases or conspiracy theories.³

Figure 1: Pathway to Violence



New York State has identified a series of strategic goals and objectives designed to prevent targeted violence. These strategic goals represent a pivot from the post-9/11 mindset generally focused on international terrorism, to the exclusion of other kinds of terrorist violence. These goals embrace a broader understanding of terrorism that recognizes the diversity of threats facing New York State, including domestic terrorism, and explicitly calls for a multidisciplinary approach that invests in the social institutions required for healthy communities, as well as law enforcement.

The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans developed by each jurisdiction are a critical pillar of this multidisciplinary approach. Addressing targeted violence and domestic terrorism requires engaging a broad coalition of local, state, federal, and non-governmental stakeholders. Almost every jurisdiction in New York State has expressed their intention to engage these stakeholders through a multidisciplinary TAM team or similar entity. The formation of these teams, and the DTPPs submitted by each jurisdiction, represents the operationalization and implementation of the *2023 Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy*.

³ US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Office, Threat Evaluation and Reporting Course (TERC) Training Suite

General Considerations and Planning Guidelines

THIS GUIDANCE

The guidance below is intended to provide a framework for organizing your DTPP and includes essential considerations for preventing domestic terrorism and targeted violence at the jurisdictional level. The questions throughout this guidance should be addressed in your updated DTPP. This guidance is not exhaustive and will not capture every targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention activity that may occur in your jurisdiction. We recognize that some counties may be in more advanced stages of development of their targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention efforts. Authors are to use this Guidance as a baseline, work to exceed it, and best reflect your jurisdiction's unique efforts to prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence.

WORKING SESSIONS

The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit (DTPU) will be available to conduct Working Sessions in each Jurisdiction. Like the County Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA) model developed by DHSES, in-person Working Sessions are designed to support jurisdictions in the development of their DTPPs. Attendees at the local level should include the TAM team lead, core members of that TAM team (or equivalent entity), and the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant Coordinator. In many jurisdictions, one individual may fill multiple roles; however, input from additional stakeholders, such as those identified as serving on TAM teams and those listed as key stakeholders in the *Best Practices* document, is critical to effective targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention. Leaders from TAM teams on college campuses should also be involved in this planning process to ensure the coordination of efforts within your Jurisdiction. Members of the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit will provide guidance for gathering information in advance of the Working Sessions, facilitate discussion, and provide a written report that captures key points from the session that can be used to update the DTPP. Regional representatives from the DTPU will be reaching out to schedule a Working Session in each jurisdiction.

SUBMISSION DEADLINE AND FORMAT

Updated Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans are due by **June 01, 2025**. Plans should be submitted via [password protected PDF](#) or a [password protected Word document](#) to PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov. Passwords to unlock these files should be sent in a separate e-mail. Should there be issues submitting the Plan, please contact PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov or any member of the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit for assistance.

Subsequent Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans will be submitted on a three-year schedule. On years in which an updated Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan is not submitted, jurisdictions will be required to respond to a survey to update contacts, document trainings, and update activities.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Submitted Plans should have a cover page identifying the jurisdiction and date of submission. Plans should also include a *Table of Contents* identifying sections of the Plan and any appended or annexed information. These Plans will be a reference point for three years and should reflect the professionalism and care required to effectively prevent targeted violence and domestic terrorism.

Submissions are required to identify a designated point of contact. Appendix A provides a template that can be used for your Plan to identify this point of contact as well as suggested information on all Plan authors and working group contributors for administrative and record keeping purposes.

Disclosing the elements of these Plans can undermine their usefulness in preventing domestic terrorism and, thereby, endanger public safety. These Plans may contain assessments of the current threat environments, examinations of the processes that go into creating those threat assessments, sources of information for those threat assessments, examinations of processes used to identify or report threats, details of preparedness training, plans for responding to specific types of threats, identifications of potential targets, descriptions of preventative measures currently in effect or planned for future implementation, and resources that can be used to support preparedness.

ASSESSING YOUR PROGRESS

Please provide a summary of the progress you have made towards implementing the operational components of your jurisdiction's first Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan that was submitted December 31, 2022. Also, please explain how you have used the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant funding to help develop or operationalize your Plan. You can include this as part of the introduction, conclusion, your jurisdictional overview, or as an appendix to your Plan.

Please address the following questions regarding progress since the last DTPP submission:

- What steps have you taken to implement the previous iteration of your DTPP?
- What gaps have you identified in your efforts? What steps have you taken, or will you take, to address those gaps?
- How did your jurisdiction/will your jurisdiction use the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant funding?
- Is your jurisdiction leveraging any other sources of grant funding for domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention purposes? If yes, please highlight the sources.
- Please describe any success stories related to your TAM team, the development of your DTPP, and the implementation of related plans and programs that you would like to share.

Overview

JURISDICTIONAL OVERVIEW

Recognizing the threat landscape across the US and NYS is extremely diverse, we recommend using the sources below to provide an overview of your jurisdiction, in addition to assessing and evaluating your threat environment. A broad range of accessible data sources can be utilized to strengthen awareness of the threat landscape within jurisdictions (e.g. County Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA), Census Data, CDC/ATDSR Social Vulnerability Index, Uniform Crime Data, NYS DCJS Hate Crime Report). Consider integrating credible publications and intelligence products as well as engaging with stakeholders – including regional Crime Analysis Centers, the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC), and the DHSES’ Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT) Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit (DTPU) – to determine the potential threats facing your jurisdiction. Jurisdictions are expected to conduct a comprehensive review of previous incidents and arrests connected to acts of targeted violence – including terrorism, mass shootings, and hate crimes – or acts adjacent to, or indicative of, a potential future act of targeted violence. For example, domestic violence, stalking, and animal torture have been associated with individuals committing acts of targeted violence, so observed increases in reports of these crimes could be leading indicators of concern from a community-wide perspective.

Please address the following questions regarding your jurisdiction:

- What do you assess as the domestic terrorism and targeted violence threats of highest concern in your jurisdiction and what are the specific risks associated with the threats?
- What organizations, groups, locations, and/or types of individuals may be potential targets of domestic terrorism and targeted violence? This may include both generalized communities or locations and specific locations or events of significance. One source of data may be to examine historical DHSES OCT Red Team data to see what types of potential targets were exercised.⁴ Other examples include:
 - Communities of interest (e.g., religious communities, LGBTQIA+ communities, migrants)
 - Cultural relevance/symbolism (e.g., landmarks, events, museums, community centers, places of public gathering)
 - Critical Infrastructure (mass transit, electrical grid, government/military facilities, hospitals/medical centers, other facilities relied upon by the community)
 - Educational institutions (schools, colleges, universities)
- What organizations, groups, and/or lone offenders pose a threat within your jurisdiction and how have you determined the threat? (e.g., racially motivated violent extremists, anti-government/militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, homegrown violent extremists inspired by foreign terrorist organizations)
- What special circumstances are present in your jurisdiction that influence your threat landscape?
 - Mass gatherings, seasonal events, seasonal population changes (e.g., colleges/universities, tourism, agriculture)
- What concerns have community members expressed within your jurisdiction related to targeted violence and domestic terrorism?
 - Community members provide essential insights on jurisdictional threat environments. Focus groups and/or community forums to collect structured feedback on the threat landscape allows for two-way

⁴ The inclusion of specific potential targets, especially those based upon previous cases, and use of Red Team data should be considered sensitive information used “For Official Use Only.” If this sensitive information is included, the document should not be posted for public release.

communication between those responsible for threat response and community members. Jurisdictions have collected stakeholder feedback through structured surveys, which may reach groups less likely to participate in an in-person forum. Consider using methods such as focus groups and surveys to inform threat assessment and management efforts.

REVIEW INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS

Integration with, and engagement of, formal information sharing networks helps to ensure relevant parties within the jurisdiction can receive and share pertinent domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention information. Effective information sharing within the jurisdiction, as well as with TAM teams and prevention practitioners, are essential to combatting targeted violence and domestic terrorism. These intelligence and information sharing network engagements may include, but should not be limited to:

- An established relationship with the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC)
- An established relationship with the regional New York State Police (NYSP) Troop
- An established relationship with local Crime Analysis Centers (CACs)
- Active participation in the regional Counter Terrorism Zone (CTZ) meetings
- A relationship with the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
- Participation in the Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO), Field Intelligence Officer (FIO), and Jail Intelligence Officer (JIO) programs
- Other dedicated information sharing networks or taskforces at the local level

In addition to sharing intelligence and information with law enforcement agencies, jurisdictions must have a process to share and receive relevant information with non-law enforcement agencies (e.g., schools, mental and behavioral health, social services, probation) and with other TAM teams across the state or within their jurisdiction.

Please address the following questions regarding your Intelligence and Information Sharing Network using the examples above as a guide:

- What intelligence and information sharing networks exist to inform your jurisdiction's stakeholders?
 - How does your jurisdiction leverage these formal intelligence sharing networks?
- What formal information sharing agreements (e.g., MOUs) exist for sharing information outside of traditional law enforcement and intelligence partners? This could be both between multidisciplinary stakeholders on your TAM team or with external partners, such as with higher education institutions.
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to support intelligence and information sharing networks? If yes, please describe.
- If you have specific contacts for, or on, your TAM team from the information sharing networks above, consider adding them to the supplemental table of key contacts found in Appendix A.

Educate

Educating stakeholders and sharing information on indicators of targeted violence and domestic terrorism is a central pillar of primary prevention activities intended for the general population. These activities may include education and outreach campaigns for a range of audiences, programs for community wellness and social cohesion, and partnerships with both new and existing stakeholders.

EXAMINE PUBLIC OUTREACH AND EDUCATION EFFORTS

Outreach is a critical component of domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention. The public and specific community stakeholders should be informed about ongoing targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention efforts and what observable concerning behaviors are important to report to TAM teams or law enforcement. Activities to promote domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention, awareness of mobilization indicators, and proper suspicious activity reporting (SAR) tools made available to the public are an important part of targeted violence prevention. Related targeted outreach and education efforts, such as information literacy efforts to educate the public on how to spot misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation including online conspiracies tied to violent extremism should strongly be considered.

Law enforcement within the jurisdiction should actively participate in DHSES' Red Team program and other programs to promote the "See Something, Say Something" campaign. Social media is another tool that should be considered to help promote public outreach and education in addition to traditional media outreach pathways (e.g., radio, broadcast television, cable and satellite, print, and billboards).

Please address the following questions regarding your public outreach and education efforts:

- What mechanisms has your jurisdiction used to promote public outreach and education related to domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention?
 - How has your jurisdiction identified and engaged with key stakeholders that may be more likely to experience targeted violence?
 - How has your jurisdiction increased awareness of risk factors, warning behaviors, and mobilization indicators?
 - How has your jurisdiction reduced barriers to bystander reporting?
 - How does your jurisdiction educate the community about bystander reporting?
- What specific channels has your jurisdiction utilized to connect with the public?
 - What, if any, public awareness campaigns are your jurisdiction planning to use on social media and traditional media?
 - What type of trainings or town hall events has your jurisdiction hosted for the public?
 - Please include examples of the materials you have used to support these outreach efforts (e.g., fliers, advertisements, etc.)
- In what other established education and awareness programs does your jurisdiction actively participate?
- Does your jurisdiction actively participate in, and facilitate, pre-established outreach and awareness campaigns? For example:
 - Operation Safeguard outreach – outreach directly to businesses and critical infrastructure operators that may be a target of, or exploited by, terrorists
 - Red Team program - contribute personnel to Red Team or Safety Teams

- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to support public outreach and education efforts? If yes, please describe.

PARTICIPATE IN AND PROMOTE TRAINING

A wide variety of training programs to prevent and mitigate the threat of domestic terrorism and other forms of targeted violence are available to jurisdictions through a range of providers including federal and state government agencies. This training includes, but is not limited to, training on domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention awareness, threat assessment and management training for TAM team members and other professionals, HIPAA/FERPA training, and others. Attending, promoting, and offering trainings relevant to the targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention mission are a vital piece of educating and informing stakeholders.

DTPU staff have completed the National Threat Evaluation and Reporting (NTER) Office's Master Trainer Program which certified the instruction of Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (BTAM) techniques and best practices. Master Trainers are available to teach the Threat Evaluation and Reporting Course (TERC) training suite to all jurisdictions by request. The training suite includes three-hour, one-day, and three-day offerings for a range of stakeholders involved in the prevention of targeted violence, as well as a short virtual offering. Please contact your DTPU regional representative, or email PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov, for further information on how to schedule a TERC delivery.

Please address the following questions regarding your participation in, and promotion of, training:

- What major trainings has your TAM team received? What level of training?
 - For example, how many members of your team have received the Threat Evaluation and Reporting Course (TERC) and at which level? (TERO three-hour awareness level; B-TERC one-day basic course; TERC three-day full training designed for TAM core members)
- Are any members of your TAM or other targeted violence prevention practitioners in your jurisdiction certified Master Trainers through NTER?
- Identify which other trainings have been the most useful in support of your targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention efforts.
- What specialized trainings have members of your TAM team or other targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention practitioners within your Jurisdiction received, or are scheduled to receive?
 - Examples: Awareness for working with those with autism, special needs, or other disabilities; mental health first response, social media analysis, threat assessment in an educational setting.
- Are any of your members participating in, or accredited by, recognized behavioral threat assessment organizations – such as the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) or National Association for Behavioral Intervention and Threat Assessment (NABITA)?
 - Do you have plans to ensure one of your members is participating in, or accredited by, recognized behavioral threat assessment organizations? Alternatively, have you considered using grant funding to ensure access to an accredited threat assessment professional?
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to participate in, or promote, training? If yes, please describe.

Please use the tables in Appendix C to document trainings delivered and received.

- Please summarize trainings you and your targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention team, including your TAM team, have **received**, the objective of these trainings, and your assessment of the value and impact of these trainings.
- Please summarize trainings you and your stakeholders have **delivered** within your jurisdiction, the objective of these trainings, and your assessment of them.

Disrupt

The 2023 New York State Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy uses a public health informed approach for early prevention. Through this approach, concerning behaviors are proactively identified and assessed with the goal of moving an individual down, or off, the Pathway to Violence, thereby helping that individual and preventing acts of targeted violence. Should an individual continue down the Pathway to Violence, traditional law enforcement investigations and disruption, including arrest, remain an option.

ESTABLISH, ORGANIZE, AND MAINTAIN YOUR TAM TEAM

Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) teams are multidisciplinary teams that help identify, investigate, assess, and mitigate potential threats, to include threats of domestic terrorism and/or other acts of targeted violence. These teams work collaboratively to share information and better understand relevant risk factors, identify resources available to assist individuals displaying concerning behavior, and mitigate potential threats. The creation of a TAM team is strongly recommended as a best practice and central component of your jurisdiction's disruption strategy for your Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan.

DHSES provides resources, including grant funding, training, and technical assistance to support the creation and operation of TAM teams. These resources and technical assistance include two additional documents to support standing up, and maintaining, your TAM team: *The TAM Team Primer* and the previously mentioned *Best Practices – New York State Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans* (released April 2023).

Universities within your Jurisdiction may have TAM teams (or similarly named entities, such as Behavioral Intervention Teams) already in place. Coordination with these higher education institutions is strongly recommended as part of the development of Jurisdiction-level TAM teams.

Please address the following questions regarding your TAM team:

TAM Team Structure:

- Explain the overall structure and governance of your TAM team.
- Who are the designated co-leads or lead of your TAM team? Please include contact information for these individual(s) and any secondary contacts established for coverage and to minimize disruptions during staff turnover.
- Does your TAM team use a tiered membership structure? (e.g., core members, affiliate members, ad hoc members) If so, what are the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of members in different tiers within your TAM team?
- How does your TAM team onboard new members?
- How does your county-led TAM team connect and coordinate with K-12 and Higher Education TAM teams?
- Does your Jurisdiction have an imminent risk committee (or similarly named entity)?
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to support staffing for your TAM team structure? If yes, please describe.
- Please provide the rationale behind the structure your TAM team. This insight will provide us a better understanding of how different TAM teams work across the State.

TAM Team Information Sharing:

- How does your TAM team integrate with existing counter terrorism information sharing networks? (i.e., NYSP CTIUs/NYSIC-CTC, CTZ, FIO, ILO, JTTF/FBI)

- How does your jurisdiction facilitate information sharing between various community stakeholders and your TAM team?
- Within your TAM team, how does your jurisdiction facilitate information sharing? Does your TAM team utilize MOUs or NDAs?
- Are you aware of other TAM teams operating within your jurisdiction (for example, within K-12 or higher education settings)? If so, what procedures are in place to share information and referrals between your teams?
- What procedures exist to share information with other jurisdictions' TAM teams across NYS? Include general information sharing and ability to provide and receive referrals.

TAM Team Function & Case Management:

- How does your TAM team evaluate and adopt proposed cases and what processes and policies has your jurisdiction developed to assist?
- Does your TAM team track and store case data? If so, how? Please include any software solutions for tracking and storing case data you use. (This information helps us advise other jurisdictions on solutions that may be available).
- How often does your TAM team meet? If you have a standard date/time, it may be useful to include this information in your Plan.
- What mechanisms exist to refer cases out or receive referrals into your TAM team? (e.g., escalate a case to JTTF or receive a case that JTTF and NYSP have closed but might be relevant for a TAM team to manage)
- Does your TAM team use a formal evaluation tool for threat assessment and management? If yes, please indicate which tool or include a copy of your tool as an annex if possible.
- Does your TAM team include anyone who has formal credentialing or professional experience in behavioral threat assessment and management?
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to support TAM team function and case management? If yes, please describe.

CONSIDER HOW TO FACILITATE BYSTANDER REPORTING

The ability to receive information about specific threats or concerns is critical. Bystander reporting continues to be one of the most significant opportunities for preventing targeted violence. A bystander is anyone positioned to observe warning behaviors displayed by a person who may be considering an act of targeted violence. TAM teams provide another avenue for bystanders to report concerning behaviors to trusted figures within their respective communities when they may not feel comfortable with other traditional reporting mechanisms. By providing additional reporting mechanisms for bystanders to seek assistance, we hope to remove or lower barriers to reporting and increase overall bystander reporting.

Your jurisdiction's DTPP should consider the process by which reports could be received and relayed to a TAM team, or other entity, for action. This process may include member organizations or agencies making referrals and the use of 911, 988, 211, or other hotlines. Educational institutions and K-12 schools should consider a process for elevating threats and/or other concerning behavior to the TAM team. Your jurisdiction should also consider outreach to large employers to ensure they are aware of how to engage the services provided by the TAM team. As the jurisdiction develops these reporting mechanisms, special consideration should be given not only to how this information is first collected, but how to expedite the information sharing directly to the TAM

team or other appropriate entity (e.g., law enforcement, NYSIC, JTTF) for action. Further consideration should be given to how social media platforms and other online communication platforms are conduits for “leakage” and indicators of radicalization, and how the jurisdiction can use that information to identify and address threats.

Please address the following questions regarding your facilitation of bystander reporting:

- How do you plan to facilitate bystanders reporting to your TAM team? Have you created, or plan to create, a way for the public to directly contact your TAM team (e.g., use 911 as a screening mechanism, specific phone number, e-mail, website, app)?
- What other channels has your jurisdiction considered using to receive reports of concerning behavior or suspicious activity? How do these work alongside your TAM reporting and processes?
- How are stakeholders informed of how to report information to the TAM team?
- What are your standard operating procedures for evaluating and directing reports of concerning behaviors or suspicious activity?
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, any sources of grant funding to facilitate bystander reporting? If yes, please describe.

Mitigate

A key pillar of domestic terrorism and targeted violence prevention is mitigation of its potential impacts to the highest degree possible. In concert with efforts to educate stakeholders and disrupt those on the Pathway to Violence, mitigation measures should be taken to deter, or minimize, the consequences of an attack. As the threat environment continues to rapidly evolve, mitigation measures such as target hardening, emergency planning, exercises, and relationship building will help jurisdictions evolve with it.

Mitigation also links back to education and awareness by ensuring that stakeholders, especially those more likely to be targeted by domestic terrorism and targeted violence attacks, are aware of your prevention efforts.

IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TARGETS, ASSESS VULNERABILITIES, AND ENGAGE IN TARGET HARDENING

Jurisdictions should work with local schools (K-12 and higher education institutions), religious institutions, civic organizations, courts, government buildings, mass gathering sites, community centers, hospitals, critical infrastructure, and other key locations⁵ to understand what target hardening, and other security measures, are in place. At a minimum, your jurisdiction should develop relationships and ensure open lines of communication with these entities to better understand potential vulnerabilities and encourage bystander reporting. Jurisdictions should also ensure security measures are in place for large-scale mass gathering events.

Please address the following questions regarding potential target identification, vulnerability assessments, and target hardening:

- What actions has your jurisdiction taken to support target hardening of potential targets within your area?
- Has your jurisdiction considered cybersecurity when assessing vulnerabilities and target hardening?
- Has your jurisdiction, or have any entities within your Jurisdiction, received grant funding for target hardening?
- What processes does your jurisdiction use to plan physical security for mass gatherings? Does your jurisdiction use a mass gathering planning tool? If so, please identify the tool and, if possible, attach that tool or plan as an annex to the submission of your Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan.
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, grant funding to help identify potential targets, assess vulnerabilities, and engage in target hardening? If yes, please describe.
- Has your jurisdiction supported any organizations that have received funding from the Securing Communities Against Hate Crimes (SCAHC) Program or Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP)?

DEVELOP ACTIVE SHOOTER/ACTIVE ASSAILANT PLANS

Active shooter, or active assailant type attacks, are a common tactic among domestic terrorists and other perpetrators of targeted violence. Such an event is likely to overwhelm local response capabilities in even the most well-funded and trained jurisdictions. Effective response to an active shooter event requires effective planning and role reinforcement through training for personnel caught in the event. Leaders coordinating the response must also exercise the skills to manage under the stress of such an event. As such, jurisdictions should

⁵ A key location may be anything the community relies upon. For example, the Tops Friendly Markets in East Buffalo was one of the only locations in the area where residents could buy groceries and pay bills. Accordingly, one of the ancillary effects of the Buffalo mass shooting was to close this vital community resource, which created a series of financial and subsistence issues that further traumatized the community.

review current active shooter/active assailant response plans (if applicable), update them as necessary, and exercise them on a regular basis. These plans should go beyond initial law enforcement response and should address, at a minimum:

- Agency roles and responsibilities
- Associated response actions and capabilities
- Crisis Communications
- Mass Care and Family Assistance
- Health and Medical Support (including mental and behavioral health support)
- Incident Recovery Considerations

Please address the following questions regarding your development of active shooter or active assailant plans:

- Does your jurisdiction have an active shooter and or/active assailant plan?
 - If yes, when was the plan most recently exercised and who participated?
- Please append a copy of your jurisdiction's active shooter/active assailant plan if applicable.
- Have you taken any steps to increase the linkage between these plans and your DTPP?
- If your jurisdiction does not have an active shooter and/or active assailant plan, please indicate whether you intend to develop one and document the steps that will be taken to adopt a plan.
- Have you, or do you intend to use, grant funding to develop active shooter and/or active assailant plans? If yes, please describe.

ENGAGE IN SCHOOL SAFETY PLANNING

New York State school districts are required to develop, review, and regularly update school safety plans at the district and building level. The districtwide school safety plan and building level emergency response plan are intended to define how each school district, and all the buildings in the district, will respond to acts of violence and other disasters through prevention, intervention, emergency response, and management. Law enforcement and other relevant community entities should be an active participant in the planning process.

[Education Law §2801-a](#) and [State Education Commissioner's Regulation §155.17](#) require that each public school and BOCES develop and annually update a confidential building-level Emergency Response Plan (ERP) that includes details about how school personnel and students would respond to different types of emergency situations that may occur in their school. In addition, each public school district, BOCES, and charter school must also develop and annually update a district-wide school safety plan that provides critical information to parents, educators, and the school community about the policies and procedures that are in place related to school safety.

Please address the following questions regarding your engagement in school safety planning:

- How many entities to which §155.17 apply are in your jurisdiction?
- Have schools in your jurisdiction submitted their required school safety plans to the appropriate local law enforcement agency and New York State Police as required in §155.17?
- Please describe the school safety planning process in your jurisdiction.
- Which agencies are involved in the school safety planning process in your jurisdiction?
- Has your jurisdiction provided any support to school districts outside of emergency planning support? (e.g., training, education, outreach, etc.)

- How do school safety plans fit into your overall DTPP?
- Have you used, or do you intend to use, grant funding to engage in school safety planning? If yes, please describe.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2022 BUFFALO MASS SHOOTING RESPONSE EFFORT

The FBI defines domestic terrorism as “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”⁶ This means the act of terrorism – in other words, the act of mass violence – is not always the end goal. Rather, the damage that violence causes to the community and our system of government may be the true end goal. Accordingly, your jurisdiction’s ability to rapidly respond to the social impact of an attack may determine the “success” of the terrorist attack. Therefore, as jurisdictions refine their Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan, it is essential to address immediate, short-term, and long-term needs of the community should prevention efforts fail to stop an attack.

Below are key takeaways identified by NYS Office of Emergency Management (OEM) from the support provided to Buffalo after the Tops Friendly Markets mass shooting. As you refine your plan, these insights may assist you with developing a post-attack response strategy.

Understand Communities’ Historical Background and Existing Social and Economic Concerns.

- Knowledge about existing social vulnerabilities in each community within your jurisdiction allows jurisdictions to acquire a deeper understanding of potential impacts to the community.
 - Consider expanding the traditional scope of “critical infrastructure” to include key community activity and service hubs that, if targeted, would significantly disrupt the larger community. For example, the Top Friendly Markets attacked was the only grocery store in the area, and it was where many community members went to pay bills in cash. The attack not only traumatized the community, but the closure of the Tops Friendly Markets store in this location further disrupted the community for an extended period.
 - Consider whether historically disinvested communities may have distrust in government and consider this in response planning.
- Jurisdictions should identify dependable local/community partners and foster stronger relationships with a wider group of organizations that will understand the needs of disinvested communities and assist with response.

Establish Centralized Points of Command for Immediate Response, and Short- and Long-Term Recovery.

- Establish an identified lead agency for immediate response as well as short-term and longer-term recovery.
- Ensure all response agencies and organizations understand the scope of the incident and know who is responsible for leading different lines of response efforts. This ensures response entities know *their* chain of command and effectively and efficiently begin response work.

⁶ <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>

Strengthen Communication & Understand Each Stakeholder’s Role in Advance.

- Effective communication requires formalized, funded, and legitimized liaisons and communication channels directly with community organizations.
- This type of communication can avoid service duplication from multiple agencies/organizations and increase efficiency in resource distribution and response.
- Regular meetings with, and convening of, community organizations and local government organizations can help strengthen communication and develop a shared understanding of different agencies’ roles for preparedness, response, and recovery. Considering achieving this through including these entities in TAM teams or trainings.

Establish Long-Term Planning and Support for Local Communities and Exercise your Plan.

- Invite appropriate organizations (governmental and non-governmental) to assist with plan development and tabletop exercises that test your plans. Consider including family assistance centers, community resource centers, direct support for victims, and support for the larger community with particular focus on vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, school-age children, high-poverty neighborhoods, etc.), District Attorney’s Offices and federal partners.
- Community organizations and leaders may provide useful guidance on how to structure a response plan, especially as it relates to trauma services and mental and behavioral health support. Community organizations generally understand community needs and have established trust and are in a strong position to “fill the gap” during critical times. They can quickly identify relevant programs/resources and mobilize rapidly to provide support. Consider how you might integrate them into your response plan.
- For financial support, consider whether funding structures can be streamlined to ensure funds that would be used for community support are readily accessible in an emergency.
- For operational support, consider how your jurisdiction will transition from immediate law enforcement response to evidence collection and victim support.
- Identify in advance agencies that will be involved in later response phases after the initial law enforcement response concludes and involve them in planning and training sessions. While it is important to focus on the immediate law enforcement response, it is also essential to consider the longer-term mental and behavioral health and social service needs of the larger community. Familiarize yourself with the tools that social services and mental and behavioral health organizations can provide.
- Be culturally aware when developing your response plan. If a racially motivated violent extremist attacks a community because of their race, for example, you may need to identify service providers representative of that community to assist with your response. This will be easier to address if you have familiarity with the different groups that live within your jurisdiction and have thought through where these resources might be found.

Please address the following questions regarding your recovery planning:

- How have you prepared to address short-term community needs, such as food, medical care, or education, especially if a key community hub, such as a grocery store, hospital, or school is targeted? (This list is not exhaustive, and we encourage you to consider other community hubs that should be considered.)
- Which governmental and non-governmental entities have you invited to assist with this phase of plan development?

- Do you plan to conduct a Tabletop exercise to test your plans, and would you consider inviting these organizations to participate? If not, what is your strategy to ensure they are integrated into your response plan?
- Which local organizations other than law enforcement and emergency management agencies are you engaging with to ensure social services are available in the aftermath of an attack? And how are you ensuring you are familiar their capabilities and resources, and how to access them?
- Persons not Injured (PNIs) can be a challenging group to identify during and after an incident, but they will be critical witnesses if and when the perpetrator is brought to justice. How will you identify witnesses or incentivize them to come forward? Have you involved you Jurisdiction's prosecutors' offices in this phase of plan development?

Conclusion

New York State has experienced tragic reminders of the importance of confronting acts of targeted violence and domestic terrorism. This work is critical; the lives of New Yorkers depend upon it. And the development and implementation of Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plans (DTPP) are central to these efforts. DTPPs memorialize efforts to tackle these threats by New York State's unique jurisdictions. They provide an overview of the threat environment across the State and detail efforts to "Educate, Disrupt, and Mitigate" targeted violence and domestic terrorism. They also offer innovative solutions and best practices that should be shared throughout the State.

Preventing targeted violence and domestic terrorism requires the support of organizations and leaders across the public, private, and non-profit sectors. That is why New York State is so committed to providing the resources, training, and technical assistance needed to address the rise in targeted violence of all kinds, including domestic terrorism.

The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Unit (DTPU) is available to your jurisdiction as a resource in developing your DTPP. An in-person working session will be offered to each jurisdiction to support the development of the updated DTPP and should consist of a range of multidisciplinary stakeholders involved in targeted violence and domestic terrorism prevention. The DTPU will facilitate a collaborative discussion around each of the topics included in this guidance, share ideas you may consider incorporating into your Plan, and provide a written report that captures key points from the session that can be used to update your Plan to have ready to submit in advance of June 01, 2025.

Thank you for the role you play in preventing targeted violence and domestic terrorism in your community. Please contact your DTPU regional representative or PreventDT@dhses.ny.gov with any questions about this guidance.

APPENDIX A – Key Contacts

Role	Name	Title/Rank	Agency	Email Address
Domestic Terrorism Prevention Plan Author				
Threat Assessment & Management (TAM) Team Lead (or equivalent entity)				
Domestic Terrorism Prevention Grant Program Lead				

Please also provide details for secondary contacts, other stakeholders, and/or key members of your information sharing network involved in your efforts to prevent targeted violence and domestic terrorism (use additional sheets if necessary):

Role	Name	Title/Rank	Agency	Email Address

APPENDIX B – Plan Development

Date	Setting (e.g., DTPU-Facilitated Working Session, TAM Team Meeting, E.M. Meeting)	Stakeholder Groups Present (e.g., Law Enforcement, Mental and Behavioral Health, Education, etc.)	Number of Attendees

APPENDIX C – Trainings
Trainings Delivered

Training Title	Description	Training Date(s)	Presenting Organization(s)	Target Audience	Estimated Attendance

Trainings Received

Training Title	Description	Training Date(s)	Presenting Organization(s)	Target Audience	Number of Personnel Trained